The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

60. You Ji, “Taiwan in the Political Calculations of the Chinese
Leadership,” The China Journal, Vol. 36, July, 1996, pp. 117-125.
61. Information obtained from people with deep knowledge
of PLA elite politics in Beijing.
62. Xin Qi (辛旗) and his organization, a think tank associated
with the 2nd department of the GSD (总参二部), played a crucial
role in the drafting process.
63. From 1999, Hu began to preside over the annual national
TAO conference, normally held in December each year. He also
presided over the meeting where Qian Qishen announced the
“new three-sentence.”
64. It is said that few matters have captured Hu’s personal attention
more than Taiwan affairs. For instance, he has personally
called leaders of the TAO for their prediction on the outcome of a
major forthcoming election in Taiwan. As many issues in the bilateral
negotiation may have a profound impact on Beijing’s longterm
Taiwan policy, he also has to make decisions himself, often
in a prompt manner.
65. This is best revealed by Hu’s speech to his first news conference
as the Party’s new leader on November 15, 2002, Xinhua
New Agency, November 16, 2002.
66. Liu Jixian (刘继贤), “学习胡锦涛军队政治工作思想的认识”
(“Understanding Hu Jintao’s thinking on the political work of the
PLA, Part One”), 中国军队政治工作 (Political Work in Chinese Military),
No. 10, 2008, p. 2.
67. As the balance of power has decisively shifted in favor
of the mainland, Beijing has more options against Taiwan’s challenge.
See a roundtable discussion by Asia Policy on the concept
of healthy balance across the Taiwan Strait, Asia Policy, No. 8,
2009.
68. James Thomson, “US Interests and the Fate of Alliances,”
Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2003-04, p. 214.
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