The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Winter 2010, pp. 17-35. For indications that China may have decided
to devote more resources to deck aviation development, see
邓佑标 (Deng Youbiao), “海军大连舰艇学院首次招收飞行学员”
("Dalian Naval Vessel Academy Recruits Flight Students for the
First Time"), 解放军报 (Liberation Army Daily), September 5, 2008,
p. 5, available at www.chinamil.com.cn, or in English as “Dalian
Naval Academy Recruits Pilot Cadets for the First Time,” Liberation
Army Daily, September 5, 2008, english.chinamil.com.cn.
169. For detailed analysis, see Gabriel Collins and Michael
Grubb, A Comprehensive Survey of China’s Dynamic Shipbuilding
Industry: Commercial Development and Strategic Implications, China
Maritime Study 1, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2008.
170. Here China appears to have shipyard capacity but not yet
the intention to use it in this fashion. Two of China’s 5 fleet AORs
are approaching obsolescence. At some point in the next decade,
they will have to be replaced. If China intends to support more
than limited long range operations, more will need to be added.
171. If China wishes to maintain a limited posture that is focused
on day to day operations in peacetime or the ability to participate
in MOOTW type scenarios, it will not need tenders. The
U.S. has this capability because of its large forward presence and
a requirement to conduct a full range of combat operations with
its fleet. Unless the Chinese are going to go that route, they only
need the capability to conduct minor repairs; any ship needing
sophisticated repairs could be sent back to China. In the absence
of tenders, a navy determined to conduct significant blue-water
SLOC security missions would probably need either the ability
to bring technicians along in some capacity, access to technologically
sophisticated port facilities, or both.
172. Following the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, for instance,
Beijing was unwilling or unable to send ships, but witnessed the
United States, India, and Japan receiving significant appreciation
for their deck-aviation-based assistance.
173. The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with
Chinese Characteristics, Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence,
July 2009, p. 19. Scott Bray adds: “ONI bases its assessments of the
timeline for operationalization of KUZNETSOV CV Hull 2 (commonly
referred to as the former Russian carrier VARYAG) on a
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