The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

to the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) condemnation
of the satellite launch, Pyongyang declared
it would withdraw from the Six-Party Talks, would
not be bound by any agreements it had made during
the Six-Party Talks and would restore its nuclear facilities
to ensure the DPRK could sustain its nuclear
deterrent posture. Pyongyang then ended its cooperation
with the International Atomic Energy Administration
(IAEA), dismantled the monitoring equipment,
removed the seals at its Yongbyon nuclear plant, and
expelled IAEA inspectors and the U.S. nuclear disablement
inspection group. On April 25, Pyongyang stated
it had begun reprocessing the Yongbyon reactor’s fuel
rods. April 29 saw Pyongyang declare the Six-Party
Talks dead, and that a second nuclear test and a ballistic
missile launch were in the offing. A second nuclear
test was conducted on May 25, together with the
firing of short-range missiles. Moreover, Pyongyang
announced it would no longer abide by the Korean
Armistice Agreement of 1953. In effect, Pyongyang
had totally rejected Beijing’s position that peace and
stability of the Korean peninsula can only be restored
with the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and the denuclearization
of the Korean peninsula through these
negotiations.
Initial PLA opinions were expressed in no uncertain
terms. General Chen Bingde, the PLA Chief of
Staff, expressed his opposition to the nuclear test and
missile launches saying they complicated the Korean
peninsula situation, could prompt the Republic of Korea
(ROK) to develop its own nuclear weapons, and
would grant the U.S. additional grounds to intervene
in regional affairs. 20 Rear Admiral Yang Yi, formerly
Director of the PLA-NDU’s [National Defense Unitiversity’s]
Institute for Strategic Studies, summed up
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