The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

East China Seas to exercise maximum restraint, again
following the Politburo’s decision. 18 Furthermore,
there is a long lasting discrepancy between civilian
and military interests over the military’s budget. The
PLA’s structural shortfall in funding has stimulated
PLA strategists to persistently require an increase
in the military’s share of 1.7 percent in the gross domestic
product (GDP) total to 3 percent, and from 8
percent in government expenditure to 12-15 percent. 19
Apparently, the civilian leaders have not budged. The
fact that no matter how reluctantly the PLA has swallowed
what is imposed upon it indicates that it is very
conscious of civilian supremacy over it.
On the other hand, PLA subordination has been
rewarded in this relationship of shared interests with
the Party that defines the relationship today. Actual
civil-military interest-sharing has served as a political
foundation for the PRC’s political system from which
each organization benefits enormously. Additionally,
interest-sharing is grounded on their shared national
goal of making China socially stable, economically
prosperous, and militarily powerful (富国强兵). 20 In
addition, the PLA actively embraces the Party’s promotion
of nationalism, concretely expressed by their
shared determination to safeguard Beijing’s sovereignty
over domestic governance and territorial integrity.
For instance, anti-Taiwan independence has
become a key ideological anchorage for Party/military
interaction. The PLA’s focus on external threats
is enhanced by its deeply rooted anti-Americanism
that has translated into support for the Party’s goal
of power consolidation at home and preparation for
international conflict.
In 1999, the Party decided to accelerate preparation
for war and made military modernization a
142