The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

was he inclined to form his own faction when in charge
of the Party’s organizational affairs. Although Xi has
tried to imitate Hu, there has been talk of him placing
his former inferiors in leadership positions. His image
as a key member of the princelings grouping is widely
believed, and rightly or wrongly, generates difficulty
for public acceptance of him as the ultimate leader. 54
The inclusion of Li in the PSC was well anticipated.
When all of the criteria were considered, he seemed to
have no contender: he enjoys the closest personal ties
with Hu that can be traced back in the early 1980s;
he is the only person among the nine new Politburo
members who served two full terms as a CC member;
and he held full ministerial/provincial posts for 10
years. Therefore, he has the best seniority. Very importantly,
he had the ideal age of a bit over 50 in 2007,
which would be crucial if Hu has to go for a third term
completely or for a proportion of it. Prior to the primary
vote, he seemed to be the sole candidate for the
top job.
In a way, listing Xi ahead of Li in the PSC was a
surprise. Xi was just appointed to be Shanghai’s party
boss a few months earlier. It has been extremely rare
for this kind of quick transfer to happen in CCP history.
If it was decided for him to take over Party affairs
from Zeng Qinghong in October and ultimately
the Party’s helm, it would have been more logical to
transfer him to Beijing directly from Zhejiang in April
to assist Zeng in personnel matters for the 17th Congress,
a platform constructed to groom Hu in the 15th
Congress. Logically, the decision on Xi was made
promptly, but this was not helpful for a consensus to
be brewed on him as the successor.
It may well be a historical accident that Xi was
placed ahead of Li. Xi is basically a politician versed
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