The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

ered variants of “sea control,” or command of the sea
sufficient to allow one’s own vessels to operate freely
in a given sea area by preventing opponent(s) from
attacking them directly. Most naval theorists would
differentiate these two approaches, the latter of which
is far more demanding than the former and requires
a much broader range of capabilities, even for operations
within the same geographic area—it is not simply
a question of “being able to do more from further
away.” As such, the first benchmark is arguably within
China’s grasp today; there is no guarantee that the
last will ever be pursued.
China’s naval development thus far has been focused
largely on developing a variant of regional
anti-access to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence,
in part by developing credible capabilities
to thwart U.S. forces should Washington elect to intervene
in a cross-Strait crisis. Taiwan’s status remains
the most sensitive, and limiting, issue in U.S.-China
relations. But Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s March
2008 landslide election, and his pragmatic policies,
have greatly reduced the risk of conflict. Now, with
cross-Strait relations stable and China continuing to
grow as a global stakeholder, China’s navy is likely to
supplement its Taiwan and South China Sea-centric
access denial strategy that its current naval platforms
and weaponry largely support with “new but limited
requirements for protection of the sea lanes beyond
China’s own waters, humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief, and expanded naval diplomacy.” 155 Table 4
outlines the PLAN’s current order of battle.
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