The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

taken a reluctant but positive-sum response toward
Ma’s requests in economic and diplomatic areas. Yet
all of Beijing’s compromises so far seem to have been
tactical by nature in comparison with its new strategic
gains.
The strategic significance for Beijing of the
Kuomintang (KMT) in power can be concretely seen
from the following points.
1. It gives Beijing an extended “strategic opportunity
period” until 2016. This would be a further extension
of 8 years that Beijing has already obtained,
thanks to the War on Terrorism since 2001. By 2016,
the PLA will be closer to achieving mutual assured
destruction (MAD) capabilities vis-à-vis the United
States, which would complicate Washington’s decisionmaking
process on whether to participate in a Taiwan
war. By then, China’s economic power will have
reached a new height and delivered much greater
military transformation.
2. The likely decombatification (去战争化) in the
Strait helps reduce the level of militarization in the
Sino-U.S. relations. As Taiwan is the only cause for
the pair to see each other in a war, 68 peace in the Strait
on the basis of maintaining the status quo, the core of
Ma’s mainland policy, may help remove the most likely
trigger for armed conflict between the two nuclear
powers. Without a drag such as the Taiwan issue on
China’s diplomacy, Beijing can deal with challenges
posed by some countries with a relatively freer hand,
as seen by its tough response to Canberra’s visa permit
to Rebiya Kadeer (a Uyghur political dissident in
exile). 69
3. Reduced level of tension in the Strait helps Hu
concentrate his time and energy on handling his priority
concerns over domestic stability. One of these
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