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The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

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So why is Beijing making this effort? Rear Admiral<br />

Yin Zhuo, director of a naval expert committee, explains<br />

th<strong>at</strong> China lacks formal rel<strong>at</strong>ions with NATO. 132<br />

Closer cooper<strong>at</strong>ion “would involve the sharing of<br />

intelligence codes, which is a sensitive military <strong>and</strong><br />

political issue.” 133 <strong>The</strong>re are several broader potential<br />

explan<strong>at</strong>ions for China’s hesit<strong>at</strong>ion: lack of experience<br />

<strong>and</strong> prepar<strong>at</strong>ion, sensitivity regarding sovereignty,<br />

<strong>and</strong> concerns about revealing Chinese capabilities (or<br />

lack thereof). For example, there appear to be some<br />

Chinese concerns th<strong>at</strong> their vessels will be subject to<br />

scrutiny. Rear Admiral Yang Yi st<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> “some secretive<br />

reconnaissance does take place”; Sr. Captain Li<br />

Jie of the Naval Research <strong>Institute</strong> adds th<strong>at</strong> “As long<br />

as all parties keep their activities to a minimum, military<br />

powers will not engage in disputes.” 134<br />

<strong>The</strong> author is concerned th<strong>at</strong> the “p<strong>at</strong>rol zone” approach,<br />

if adopted, is unlikely to be effective. First, dividing<br />

the sea among different n<strong>at</strong>ions evokes a sort of<br />

“Cold War” mentality, just as post-war Germany was<br />

divided into different sectors th<strong>at</strong> l<strong>at</strong>er led to a painful<br />

<strong>and</strong> prolonged n<strong>at</strong>ional division. Second, some sea<br />

areas are much busier than others, so this would result<br />

in an inefficient distribution of forces. Third, some n<strong>at</strong>ions<br />

navies may be more capable <strong>and</strong>/or experienced<br />

than others, so there is a risk th<strong>at</strong> some areas might be<br />

less-secured than others. This could be very difficult<br />

to solve, as it might be very difficult for any n<strong>at</strong>ion to<br />

acknowledge th<strong>at</strong> its forces were not able to perform<br />

adequ<strong>at</strong>ely. Fourth, such a “distributed unil<strong>at</strong>eral”<br />

approach seems regrettable when there is sufficient<br />

support in the intern<strong>at</strong>ional community for a genuine<br />

“cooper<strong>at</strong>ive multil<strong>at</strong>eral” approach.<br />

For all these reasons, a far more effective approach<br />

would be to support the truly cooper<strong>at</strong>ive Combined<br />

Task Force-151. CTF-151 has been led by a Pakistani<br />

325

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