The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

第一次党代表会代表时强调: 按照革命化现代化正规化相统一的规
则, 锻造适应我军历史使命要求的强大人民海军” ("When Hu Jintao
Met with the Naval Delegates at the 10th Party Congress, He
Emphasized Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the
Requirements to Accomplish Historical Missions of Our Army
in Accordance with the Principle of Unifying Revolutionization,
Modernization, and Standardization"), 人民海军 (People’s Navy),
December 28, 2006, p. 1. For “strengthened and modernized,”
“Chinese President Calls for Strengthened, Modernized Navy,”
People’s Daily, December 27, 2006. For “blue water,” “Chinese
President Calls for Strong Navy,” VOA News, December 28, 2006,
available at voanews.com.
159. “China’s National Defense in 2008.” China’s 2006 Defense
White Paper further states that China’s “navy aims at gradual extension
of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations
and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations.”
Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic
of China, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 29,
2006, available from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.
html. See also the statements in the official journal of the Central
Committee by PLAN commander Wu Shengli, and Political Commissar
Hu Yanlin, including, “To maintain the safety of the oceanic
transportation and the strategic passageway for energy and
resources . . . we must build a powerful navy.” 吴胜利, 胡彦林
(Wu Shengli (PLAN commander) and Hu Yanlin (PLAN political
commissar), edited by Wang Chuanzhi), “锻造适应我军历史使命
要求的强大人民海军” ("Building a Powerful People’s Navy that
Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for our Army"),
求是 (Seeking Truth), No. 14, July 16, 2007, www.qsjournal.com.
cn, OSC CPP20070716710027. A major study advised by such influential
policy makers as Dr. Qiu Yanping, deputy director of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s National
Security Leading Small Group Office, emphasizes the importance
of securing China’s sea lines of communication. Yang Yi, pp. 274,
289, 323–24. While such statements serve these individuals’ bureaucratic
interests, they must nevertheless coordinate their statements
with PLA and CCP leadership; such naval advocacy would
have been impermissible previously.
160. The PLA’s first English-language volume of its type,
The Science of Military Strategy, emphasizes that SLOC security
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