The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

41. Sun Xianglin, Liu Zhongcheng, and Li Jinchuan, pp. 11-
13; Wang Yuxin, “汶川地震对我国应急救援建设的启示" (“The
Wenchuan earthquake’s lessons for the development of our emergency
response and rescue”), 人民公安报,消防周刊 (PAP Daily,
Fire Department Weekly), July 23, 2008, p. 3; Ai Husheng, “从非战
争军事行动需要看民兵预备役建设" (“Viewing the building of militia
and reserve forces from the needs of MOOTW”), 中国国防报
(China National Defense Daily), October 30, 2008, p. 3.
42. For example, see Che Ruijin, “抗击地震灾害对加强国防动
员建设的启示" (“Lessons from the struggle against the Wenchuan
earthquake disaster for strengthening our construction of national
defense mobilization”), 国防 (National Defense), Vol. 7, 2008, pp.
12-14.
43. Sun Xianglin, Liu Zhongcheng and Li Jinchuan, pp. 11-13.
44. Che Ruijin, pp. 12-14.
45. Ibid.
46. A related, but much more difficult question would be how
disaster relief and other internal security missions affect the PLA’s
budget. Enhancement of disaster relief and anti-terrorism capability
are reported to have been part of the 17.6 percent increase
in China’s 2009 defense budget over that of the previous year.
See Wendell Minnick, “China Increases defense budget,” Defense
News, March 4, 2009, available from www.defensenews.com/story.
php?i=3973307. However, given our lack of detailed information
on China’s defense budget, there is no reliable quantitative data
to indicate what kind of burden disaster relief and other MOOTW
might be putting on the PLA’s financial resources.
47. Zhao Guiqi, “Enlightenment Gained from Wenchuan
Earthquake Relief Operation in the Perspective of National Defense
Mobilization,”中国军事科学 (China Military Science), March
2008, pp. 7-13.
48. Wu Tianmin and Dong Haiming, “关键是打造核心军事
能力” (“The key is building core army capabilities”), 解放军报
281