The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

jing’s official news media constantly publishes appreciation
from Somali officials and civilians. 55
The PLAN itself has pledged a cautious, reactive
approach limited to defense of its ships and any vessels
under their escort. The explicit objective is to escort
Chinese vessels (and those of other nations on a
case-by-case basis) and thus deter pirates from attacking
them in the first place, not to actively search for
pirates and engage in combat with them. PLAN forces
will not even “take the initiative to search for captured
vessels and personnel at sea and carry out armed rescues.”
56
Moreover, according to Senior Colonel Ma Luping,
director of the navy operational bureau under the
headquarters of the General Staff, PLAN forces will
not normally enter another nation’s national territorial
seas (within the internationally recognized 12 nautical-miles
limit) to chase pirates. 57 At a press conference
accompanying the departure of the Chinese destroyer
contingent on December 26, 2008, the high-ranking
lead commander of the first deployment, South Sea
Fleet Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Du Jingcheng, said
the ships would “independently conduct escort missions”
and not land on Somali shores. 58 According to a
senior Chinese military official: “For us to use force is
a very complex matter . . . it is not just a simple question
based on an operational requirement. . . . There
are political questions—and these are not issues dealt
with by military commanders alone. Our warships off
Somalia are very well aware of this. We are fully prepared
to use force, but we do not take that step lightly.”
59 It thus seems clear that China wants to avoid
using force in another nation’s land or territorial sea 60
to avoid setting a precedent that might later be used
against it. Huang Li emphasizes that, according to
307