The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Taiwan policy, Deng transferred a PLA general Yang
Side (杨思德), (his man in the 2nd Field Army [第二
野战军]) to lead the Taiwan Affairs Office. The PLA
involvement in Taiwan affairs is traditionally both
deep and dominant. And the PLA has a decisive say,
if not the final say, in setting the overall direction of
Beijing’s Taiwan policy. This was clearly reflected by
the drafting process of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005,
which was basically a PLA process with civilian legal
support. 62
On the other hand, simply due to the CMC’s oneman
responsibility system (一长制) under the Party
leader, it is difficult for the PLA to exert itself excessively
in the top decisionmaking process. Normally,
the commander in chief finalizes his Taiwan policy
in the meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee
(PSC) rather than at the August First Building (八一
楼). But he listens to his CMC colleagues extensively
over any major Taiwan policy. In this process, Hu can
wear different hats. In the meetings of the PSC he can
be representative of the armed forces, and in the CMC
meetings discussing Taiwan issues, he can be the Party
boss. Since 1999 when Hu was entrusted to oversee
the running of the Small Leading Group of Taiwan Affairs
(对台工作领导小组), he has gradually developed
his distinctive leadership style: compared with Jiang,
he can be softer when wielding an olive branch and
harder when employing military pressure. Generally,
he is more masterful in doing the former than the latter.
63 Thanks to the complicated nature of cross-Strait
relations, Hu has to make prompt controversial decisions
against agency inputs, such as how to respond
to Ma’s approval of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan
in August. This requires the power of decision on Taiwan
affairs to be highly concentrated and integrated
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