The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

carriers might rapidly become an important diplomatic
instrument for projecting Chinese presence and
influence in Asia, and perhaps (eventually) globally.
By this logic, moving toward a carrier-centric navy
could prompt other navies in the region and further
afield to upgrade their own forces in anticipation of
China’s taking a more assertive stance regarding naval
power projection. Despite efforts both to channel
China’s maritime development in a peaceful direction
and to portray it accordingly to the rest of the world,
history suggests that any major military modernization
program is likely to antagonize other powers.
Internationally, moving toward a carrier-centric navy
could prompt other regional and global navies to upgrade
their own forces in anticipation of China’s taking
a more assertive stance regarding naval power
projection.
I foresee a very different trajectory for China’s
navy. While China will no doubt build as many as
several carriers over the next decade, its two-level approach
to naval development is likely to persist for
some time, with parallel implications for American
security interests. China’s military has achieved rapid,
potent development by maintaining an anti-access
posture along interior lines and exploiting physicsbased
limitations inherent in the performance parameters
of U.S. and allied platforms and C4ISR systems. 200
This should be of tremendous concern to Washington.
But dramatic breakthroughs here should in no way be
conflated with developments further afield: the core
elements of this approach cannot easily be transferred
to distant waters. In perhaps the most graphic example
of this strategic bifurcation, the Chinese military,
as it develops increasing capabilities to target aircraft
carriers, is likely becoming acutely aware of their vul-
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