The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

is how to pursue the next round of CCP succession.
Without an overt disruption by a Taiwan challenge,
arranged succession can be conducted with a reasonable
level of smoothness.
4. Taiwan’s creeping independence lost momentum
when it lost state sponsorship. For a long while,
Beijing had no effective countermeasures against the
salami independence moves, which convinced many
strategists of an inevitable war in the Strait. 70 Now the
situation is reversed in that an elected leader helps
curb the trend from within. Ma’s de-de-Sinification
(去去中国化) effort has given Beijing precious time in
a race to build a more solid foundation for its longterm
effort of reunification.
5. Taiwan’s economic dependence on Beijing will
have deepened significantly by 2016 as the current
quickened pace of integration between the two sides
continues, driven by three-direct-links and the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
When half of Taiwan’s economic activities are tied to
that of the mainland, according to a Chinese economist,
de jure independence will almost become an unrealizable
concept. 71
The list expands. Predictably, as long as Ma’s nonindependence
stance holds, concessions from Beijing
will be further expected. Beijing’s gesture of goodwill
to improve bilateral relations will be integrated into
its practical effort to help the KMT win a second term
in 2012. The immediate policy challenge, however, is
how to recalibrate the existing hierarchical order of
the two-pronged policy: peace inducement and threat
of force. Although in disguised form, the latter moved
to the central place in Beijing’s Taiwan policy toward
Chen’s second term in office but at a high cost: mili-
170