The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

sions, but it may gradually acquire the necessary
funding and mission scope. China’s growing maritime
interests and energy dependency may gradually
drive more long-ranging naval development; indeed,
repeated reports of imminent aircraft carrier development
seem to represent an initial step in this direction.
China is likely to develop some form of deck aviation
capability, both for national prestige and for limited
missions beyond Taiwan. 172 ONI estimates that China’s
former Ukrainian Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier
Varyag will become operational as a training platform
by 2012, and “the PRC will likely have an operational,
domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015.” 173
Developing the necessary forces, training, and experience
for true blue water combat capabilities would be
extremely expensive and time-consuming, however.
Building an aircraft carrier is one thing; mastering the
complex system of systems that enable air power projection
costs years and precious lives. 174
Overseas Facilities Access?
Perhaps the strongest indicator of Chinese intentions
to develop blue water power projection capabilities
would be pursuit of reliable access to overseas air
and naval bases. At present, China appears far from
having overseas naval bases of its own. 175 But recent
debate among PLA scholars and other analysts suggests
that China may be actively reconsidering its
traditional approach of avoiding “power politics and
hegemonism” by avoiding any kind of overseas military
facilities. 176
PLAAF Colonel Dai Xu, for instance, has openly
advocated Chinese development of “overseas bases
(遠洋基地)” to “safeguard commercial interests and
337