The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

tutions, defense companies, universities, and civilian
high-tech enterprises. They identify new technologies
and provide feasibility studies on various fields such
as nanotechnology, satellite applications, simulation
technology, integrated electronic warfare, and precision
guidance. 22 This has improved the supervision
and increased linkages between the various elements
of the R&D cycle, likely having an appreciable impact
on bringing key technologies into defense development.
There are a number of other important—possibly
critical—factors as to why China’s defense industry
has performed better in the past decade. At the top
of the list is the access to foreign military technology,
particularly from Russia. 23 This help has been substantial
and wide-ranging; however, as Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported,
military sales from Russia to China dropped
off sharply in 2007. China and Russia may be reaching
a divergence. With China’s emphasis on technology
transfer and indigenous innovation, it likely has less
and less to glean from military trade with Russia. On
the other hand, Russia is increasingly careful of selling
ever more advanced systems to China. Regardless of
the precise reasons, China’s continued advancement
against the backdrop of slowed sales from Russia and
other countries demonstrates that foreign assistance
plays less of a critical role to China’s defense industrial
progress. The aforementioned progress in research,
design, and production (and foreign purchases) may
explain why many of the recent weapon systems have
recently come on line, since most of them have been in
the procurement pipeline for many years.
At first blush, it is clear that in the past decade
China has made headway on a range of weapon systems
including its J-10 and J-11 fighter aircraft, new
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