The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

tion to protect China’s economic interests and citizens
abroad if they face threats and violence. Under such
circumstances, Chinese leaders may feel they have no
choice but to take action, rather than appear weak to
domestic critics. Additionally, as China successfully
demonstrates that it is willing to contribute to international
security actions in a professional manner, such
as China’s navy did in the Gulf of Aden mission, resistance
to employing China’s armed forces overseas
may diminish.
An area where a potential shift in China’s employment
of its armed forces overseas may appear over
time at key economic hubs, such as international ports,
where economic interests could draw China into more
complex security commitments and arrangements to
protect and promote its interests. China now makes
substantial investments to port improvements around
the world to facilitate the flows of goods, materials,
and commodities to and from China. In Africa, for example,
China Union, in early 2009, signed a contract,
which includes improvements to the port of Monrovia,
to develop Liberia’s Bong iron-ore project at an
estimated cost of U.S. $2.6 billion. 114 In Latin America,
China has already outstripped Japan as a major trading
partner. 115 Investments in shipping infrastructure,
such as a reported $10 billion of improvements for the
Panama Canal, 116 support China’s priorities to ship
high volume quickly to and from China.
China’s investment in Brazilian ports has grown
with the volume of trade, which made China Brazil’s
major trading partner, displacing the United States. 117
On May 19, 2009, China’s Minister of Transport, Li
Shenglin, signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Minister of Special Secretariat, Pedro Britto
that will help to further modernize Brazil’s port facili-
589