The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

for great power influence and rivalry. 183 Some PLA
analysts argue, for instance, that it should be perfectly
acceptable for China to advance to the Indian Ocean
with changes in its national interests. 184 A second assessment
in China’s official news media suggests that
to protect its newly emerging interests, China should
learn from the United States, develop several overseas
bases (e.g., in Pakistan, Burma, and Sudan), and build
three or four aircraft carriers. 185 Huang Li states that as
other nations become accustomed to the PLAN making
“frequent appearances” in the Indian Ocean, “to
look for a base on land will naturally follow” (物色陆
上基地也就顺理成章了). 186
It must be emphasized, however, that any change
is likely to be gradual, and that many countervailing
factors are likely to be at work. Countless debates over
security policy issues have failed to produce change.
Some powerful individuals are likely to resist changing
the status quo, citing concerns about cost, impact
on competing priorities, image, and departure from
historical precedent/ideology in the form of self-imposed
prohibition on foreign basing, outside of UN
missions. Moreover, the PLAN’s use of civilian and
commercial (both Chinese and host country) entities
to support its ships in the Gulf of Aden, both during
port visits as well as at sea, demonstrates that China
does not need a military presence/basing to support
military operations.
It thus seems likely that China will not establish
a “string of pearls,” with extremely expensive and
hugely vulnerable “bases.” 187 While the Chinese government’s
anti-overseas basing statements appear
to be less strident and frequent than in the past, this
would not necessarily alter Beijing’s position on foreign
“basing.” This is most in keeping with Chinese
339