The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

other areas, including the Grand Bazaar and several
ethnically mixed neighborhoods, there was little or no
police or PAP presence. 89 For hours, there was chaos
in the streets as Uyghurs overturned and destroyed
buses and other vehicles; smashed and burned shops
and other buildings; and attacked, beat, and sometimes
killed Han Chinese, apparently at random. The
delay in the police and PAP response to the rioting led
Han Chinese, too, to take to the streets both to defend
themselves and to take revenge against Uyghurs. 90
The slowness of the police and PAP response to
the violence in Urumqi, coming little more than a year
after a slow response had contributed to the rioting
in Lhasa, indicates a failure to learn some valuable
lessons. Foreign observers suggest that the slow response
in Urumqi was at least partly due to two factors:
a failure of intelligence, and the need to act first
to secure high-risk targets such as government buildings,
financial institutions, radio stations and other
strategic points. 91 Standing regulations may have
contributed to this problem: the PRC’s Contingency
Response Law, Article 50, places specific emphasis on
the need to protect likely targets of unrest including
government and military buildings and installations,
communications centers, and radio and television
broadcast facilities. 92 Another possible factor is that
the PAP simply did not have enough personnel in and
around Urumqi to handle such an unexpected, largescale
incident. As the seriousness of the situation became
evident, President Hu Jintao returned from the
G-8 meeting in Italy to take charge. PAP and also PLA
units were reportedly transferred to Urumqi from other
points within the Lanzhou MR. 93 According to one
report, 14,000 PAP troops and 490 tons of equipment
were also transported by air from Jiangsu, Henan, and
Fujian Provinces. 94
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