Umberto Eco - Limitele interpretarii

CONDITIILE INTERPRETATII
propriului interpret sd-l inzestreze af, o parte a semnificatului s5"u"
(cP,5.449)1.
Totugi, la Peirce existd alte idei care par a mina lectura propusd
de Derrida. Intr-adevdr, dacd in termenii lui Rorty teoria semiozei
nelimitate poate pdrea un exemplu de textualism, adicd de idealism,
nu putem neglija nuantele realiste ale idealismului lui Peirce2.
In ciuda caracterului failibil, a sinechismului qi a impreciziei,
ideea de semnificat Ia Peirce este astfel conceputS incAt implicd unele
referiri Ia un scop (CP, 5.166). Ideea unui scop, natural5. pentru un
pragmatician, este, in schimb, mai curAnd stAnjenitoare pentru un
,,pragmatist" (in sensul lui Rorty). Poate cd ideea unui scop nu are
nimic de-a face cu un subiect transcedental, care are cu siguranli
legdturi cu ideea de interpretare conform unei frnalitdli extra-semiozice.
Cdnd Peirce propune faimoasa definilie a litiului sub forma
unui pachet de instrucliuni inlelese ca fdcAnd posibil5 nu numai
identifrcarea, ci qi producerea unui egantion de litiu, subliniazl cE:
,,The peculiarity of this definition is that it tells you what the word
lithium denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain
a perceptive acquaintance with the object of the world" (CP, 2.330).
Orice act semiozic este determinat de un Obiect Dinamic - deoarece
este inc6 exterior cercului semiozei - care este ,,the Reality which
by some means contrives to determine the sign to its Representamen"
(cP, 4.536).
in cadrul discursului meu putem vorbi despre Obiecte Dinamice
chiar in legdturi cu textele, dat fiind c5 Obiectul Dinamic poate fi
nu numai un element de decor al lumii frzice, ci pi un gAnd, o emo-
!ie, un gest, un sentiment, o credin!5. intr-o primi instanld, ar pSrea
logic sd suslinem c5, in interpretarea propozitiilor obiEnuite cum
este comanda ,,La picior arm'!", Obiectul care trebuie cdutat poate
fi ,,universul lucrurilor dorite de cdpitan in acel moment" (CP,5.178),
adicd intenlia subiectului emi![tor. Totugi, sunt de acord cu Derrida
2.
,,Since no object in the universe can ever be fully determinate with respect to
its having or not having every known property, it follows that any proposition
about the universe is vague in the sense that it cannot hope to fully specify a
determinate set of properties" (Almeder, 1983, 331). ,,Vagueness hence represents
a sort ofrelationship between absolute, final determination, which in fact
it not attained (the condition ofan ideal, therefore) and actual determination of
meaning (again a sense, meaning, signification) in concrete semiosis" (Nadin,
1983, 163). :
,,The curreni attempts at a theory ofreality are to a great extent characterized
by the insight that the problem of reality is now fred from controversy between
idealism and realism which had long been unfruitful, and must be treated on
another level. The first and decisive step in the new direction was taken by
Peirce... This misleading phenomenon explains why, in his writings, he sometimes
calls his own position "idealistico and sometimes "realistic", without
essentially changing it" (Oehler, 1979,70).