Sentencia C-355/06 EXCEPCION DE PLEITO ... - Cornell University

embarazo y su terminación son, como principio, un temaexclusivamente relacionado con la vida privada de la madre” 351y por la Corte en la mencionada decisión de Boso. También sedesprende del análisis de estos casos que la materia siempre hasido resuelta al ponderar varios derechos o libertades, enalgunas ocasiones en conflicto, reclamados por una mujer, unamadre o un padre, en relación los unos con los otros o con el nonacido.(…)85. teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, la Corte está convencida deque no es deseable, ni posible de acuerdo al estado de las cosas,resolver en abstracto si el no nacido es una persona de acuerdoal artículo 2 de la Convención. En lo que se refiere al caso,considera que es innecesario examinar si la abrupta terminacióndel embarazo de la demandante recae en el ámbito del artículo2, viendo lo anterior, y aun asumiendo que la disposición esaplicable, no existió una violación, por parte del Estado en elcumplimiento de los requisitos relativos a la preservación de lavida en el esfera de la salud pública. En lo relativo a dichotema, la Corte ha considerado si la protección legal otorgadapor Francia, en cuanto a la pérdida del no nacida satisfizo losrequisitos procedimentales inherentes al artículo 2 de laConvención. 352351 Ver Brüggemann and Scheuten, citado arriba , pp. 116-17, § 61. (caso de la Comisión Europea deDerechos Humanos).352 Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos. V.O. contra Francia. El texto original dice: “80. It followsfrom this recapitulation of the case-law that in the circumstances examined to date by the Conventioninstitutions – that is, in the various laws on abortion – the unborn child is not regarded as a “person”directly protected by Article 2 of the Convention and that if the unborn do have a “right” to “life”, it isimplicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests. The Convention institutions have not, however,ruled out the possibility that in certain circumstances safeguards may be extended to the unborn child.That is what appears to have been contemplated by the Commission in considering that “Article 8 § 1cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as a principle, solely a matterof the private life of the mother” (see Brüggemann and Scheuten, cited above, pp. 116-17, § 61) andby the Court in the above-mentioned Boso decision. It is also clear from an examination of these casesthat the issue has always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rightsor freedoms claimed by a woman, a mother or a father in relation to one another or vis-à-vis an unbornchild.(…)85. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is convinced that it is neither desirable, nor evenpossible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a personfor the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention (“personne” in the French text). As to the instant case,it considers it unnecessary to examine whether the abrupt end to the applicant’s pregnancy falls withinthe scope of Article 2, seeing that, even assuming that that provision was applicable, there was nofailure on the part of the respondent State to comply with the requirements relating to the preservationof life in the public-health sphere. With regard to that issue, the Court has considered whether the legalprotection afforded the applicant by France in respect of the loss of the unborn child she was carryingsatisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 2 of the Convention.”