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araita, baraitot
find in the Talmud that the verb teni is used in association with
the name of an amora, for example: teni Rav Yosef. This specific
formula occurs dozens of times in the Babylonian Talmud,
and there are many other similar formula. Does this formula
intend to introduce an ancient tannaitic tradition, preserved
and transmitted in the school of Rabbi Joseph? Or alternatively
does it intend to introduce a later post-tannaitic tradition,
first formulated and recited within the school of Rabbi
Joseph himself, or within the school of one of his teachers?
We may still accept Rashi’s distinction and assume that the use
of the introductory term teni serves to designate a “tradition”
preserved and transmitted by Rabbi Joseph or by his school,
and to distinguish it from the individual opinion of the amora
himself. It does not, however, provide clear evidence as to the
historical roots of that tradition, whether it derives from the
tannaitic period, or from the later amoraic period.
The Baraita as a Legal Category
An important distinction emerges from the previous discussion:
between the baraita as a literary category and the baraita
as a legal category. Up to this point we have dealt mostly with
the baraita as a literary phenomenon – a distinct and welldefined
source, usually in Hebrew, appearing in the talmudic
discussion and introduced by certain standard formulae
which indicate that it reports a received tradition. The term
is also used in a more specific sense, to designate a tradition
deriving from sources of the tannaitic period and hence
presumably possessing a greater legal authority than similar
sources deriving from the later amoraic period – a shemata
or memra. In order to clarify this point, we must return to
our discussion of the role that these sources play in the talmudic
sugya.
The legal sources which provide the foundation for the
talmudic sugya can be divided (using standard post-talmudic
terminology) into three categories: mishnah, baraita, and
memra. While the sources belonging to all three categories
are considered to be authoritative, they are not equally authoritative.
A mishnah is usually (but not always) held to
be more authoritative than a parallel baraita. On the other
hand, either a mishnah or a baraita – as a tannaitic source –
is generally considered more authoritative than any parallel
amoraic memra. This question of relative authority, however,
only becomes relevant when these sources come into conflict
with each other. Thus two sources of equal authority (e.g. two
baraitot or two memrot) can be treated as mutually contradictory
(rumya, raminhi) for the purpose of talmudic analysis
and interpretation, but one cannot be used to refute the
other. A tannaitic source (a mishnah or a baraita), however,
can be used to refute (mativ, etive, tiyuvta) the memra of an
amora. Thus, in the case where there is no obvious way to resolve
a contradiction between a memra and an alternative legal
source, it becomes crucial to clarify whether that source is in
fact a baraita, in the legal sense of an authoritative tannaitic
source, or whether it is “merely” a memra, which the amora
may dispute (cf. Git. 42b).
It is therefore significant that not all types of baraitot
seem to possess equal authority in the context of the talmudic
sugyot, as H. Albeck has shown in his classic study Meḥkarim
ba-Baraita u-va-Tosefta (1944), pp. 15–60. He especially singled
out the baraitot associated with the names of amoraim
mentioned above (and similar groups of baraitot), pointing
out that they seem to possess little authority in the eyes of
some amoraim, who felt free to disagree with them.
The Baraita as a Historical Source
Having distinguished between the baraita as representing a
literary form and the baraita as representing a tradition deriving
from sources of the tannaitic period, we will now introduce
a second distinction – between the baraita as a legal
category and the baraita as an historical category. This is an
issue which has occupied scholars in recent years, especially
Shamma Friedman, who has devoted a number of important
studies to it (see Bibliography).
The legal authority of a talmudic baraita – the fact that it
can be used to refute the memra of an amora – depends to a
large extent on the presumption that the tradition it contains
actually derives from the tannaitic period. Does this mean
that a baraita found in the Babylonian Talmud, which reports
the opinion of a rabbi of the tannaitic period and which
clearly is accepted by the Talmud as authoritative, can be assumed
to reflect the original views of that rabbi as they were
first formulated in second century Palestine? The difficulty
of this question is compounded by the fact that these talmudic
baraitot often differ significantly in both form and content
from the parallel versions of the same traditions found in
earlier Palestinian tannaitic collections, such as the Tosefta,
Sifra, Sifrei, etc.
One of the most influential views concerning this issue
was elaborated by H. Albeck. Basing himself on the conclusions
of his previous work, Untersuchungen zur Redaction der
Mishna (1923), Albeck assumed that tannaitic sources – once
they had received final redactional form – were not changed
substantially, either with regard to their form or to their content.
Significantly different versions of the same tannaitic halakhic
source must therefore reflect ancient parallel traditions
which developed independently in different tannaitic schools
(see *Mishnah). Given that the form and the content of the
baraitot in the Babylonian Talmud usually differ from the parallel
halakhic sources found, for example, in the Tosefta, he
concluded that the Talmud neither knew nor used the Tosefta
as a source for its baraitot. From this it follows that the Talmud
must have had access to alternative collections of tannaitic
halakhic sources – all of which were subsequently lost
(Meḥkarim ba-Baraita u-va-Tosefta, 1944, 89–138).
A radically different understanding has emerged from
the recent work of Shamma Friedman. In Friedman’s view,
“the baraitot in the Babylonian Talmud which have parallel
versions in the Tosefta do not reflect a different tradition. On
the contrary, they are very similar to their parallel texts in the
Tosefta in content, order, language, and in structure. The dif-
126 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Second Edition, Volume 3