JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

this solution time is transcended. God’s ultimate justification
is a function of eternity.
These norms of rabbinic faith provided the basis of medieval
Jewish theology and philosophy. Their lack of definition
gave later Jewish thinking flexibility and their emphasis
a firm framework.
[Israel Abrahams]
Medieval Jewish Philosophy
In medieval philosophy belief is a general philosophical category
belonging to the theory of knowledge, of which religious
belief is one specific kind. The medieval philosophers distinguished
between two activities of the mind: the formulation
of propositions, and the affirmation that propositions in the
mind correspond to a reality outside the mind, and identified
belief with the latter activity. In line with this account *Maimonides
defines belief as “… the notion that is represented in
the soul when it has been averred of it that it is in fact just as it
has been represented” (Guide of the Perplexed, 1:50). In somewhat
less technical language *Saadiah defines belief as “… a
notion that arises in the soul in regard to the actual character
of anything that is apprehended. When the cream of investigation
emerges, and is embraced and enfolded by the minds
and, through them acquired and digested by the souls, then
the person becomes convinced of the truth of the notion he
has acquired” (Book of Beliefs and Opinions, introd.). Belief
defined in this manner may still be true or false, and hence it
is necessary to add criteria by means of which true beliefs may
be distinguished from false ones. Saadiah, discussing this issue,
lists four criteria which enable one to establish that a belief
is true: sense perception, self-evident propositions, inference,
and reliable tradition (ibid., introd.; cf. Maimonides, “Letter
On Astrology,” in: R. Lerner and M. Mahdi (eds.), Medieval
Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (1963), 228). This conception
of belief as the affirmation or conviction that propositions
within the mind correspond to reality outside the mind can be
traced to Greek philosophy, particularly to the Stoics.
Belief for medieval Christian, Muslim, and Jewish thinkers
meant, in the first instance, religious belief, that is, the conviction
that the teachings of Scriptures are true and that their
truth is guaranteed by the authority of their respective traditions.
At the same time they noted that philosophers also investigated
some of the same issues that interested them, e.g.,
the existence of God, the creation of the world, principles of
human morality, and they further noted that there was a similarity
between the teachings of religion and human reason.
Hence the question arose how the teachings of religion, that
is, religious beliefs, are related to the teachings of philosophy,
that is, philosophical beliefs. There were essentially three views
concerning this interrelation. There were those who, denying
that the term belief applies to philosophic teachings, affirmed
that this term in its strict sense refers only to propositions accepted
on the basis of religious authority; there were those
who permitted the application of the term only to propositions
known by way of demonstration; and there were still
belief
others, who were prepared to use the term belief for describing
both. In line with these distinctions H.A. *Wolfson classifies
the attitudes toward religious belief in a threefold fashion:
the double faith theory, according to which the acceptance of
propositions based both on religious authority and rational
demonstration constitutes belief; the single faith theory of
the authoritarian type, according to which the acceptance of
propositions based on authority alone constitutes belief; and
the single faith theory of the rational type, according to which
the acceptance of propositions based on demonstration alone
constitutes belief (JQR, 33 (1942), 213–64).
Saadiah, a proponent of the double faith theory, accepts
the notion of belief as applying to things known both by way of
authority and by way of demonstration. He maintains that the
doctrines of Scripture coincide with those of philosophy, and
that an affirmation of these doctrines, whether based on revelation
or on rational demonstration, constitutes belief. While
Saadiah advocates speculation about the truths of religion, he,
nevertheless, maintains that it is forbidden to ignore Scripture
entirely and to rely solely on one’s reason, for the reason is not
infallible, and may lead to erroneous conclusions.
*Judah Halevi, a representative of the single faith theory
of the authoritarian type, maintains that belief applies only to
things known by means of authority. According to him, belief
is an acceptance of the doctrines of Scripture based on authority,
i.e., on the fact that these doctrines of Scripture were
divinely revealed. For example, in connection with sacrifices
Halevi states categorically that “… he who accepts [sacrifices],
without examination or reasoning is better off than he
who resorts to research and analysis” (Kuzari, 2:26; see also
1:64–65, and 3:7).
Maimonides, on the other hand, is a representative of
the single faith theory of the rationalist type. He maintains
that belief applies only to things known by way of demonstration.
While he does not state categorically that an acceptance
of the doctrines of Scripture based on authority is not
belief, he definitely considers an acceptance based on demonstration
to be a more perfect form of belief. Belief is more
than verbal acceptance; it requires understanding and a rational
basis. Providing an example, Maimonides writes that
someone who utters with his lips that he believes in the unity
and incorporeality of God, while at the same time maintaining
that God has positive attributes, cannot be said to believe
truly in God’s unity. That he can maintain that God has attributes
indicates that he does not understand the principle
of God’s unity, and there is no belief without understanding
(Guide, 1:50). According to Maimonides the precept “You shall
love the Lord, your God,” cannot properly be fulfilled without
an understanding of metaphysics. Love of God, according to
Maimonides, is “proportionate to apprehension” (Guide, 3:51;
cf. Yad, Yesodei ha-Torah, 4:12).
*Levi b. Gershom shares the view of the Maimonidean
school that there is no opposition between reason and belief.
He holds that priority should be given to reason where
its demands are unambiguous, for the meaning of Scripture
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Second Edition, Volume 3 293