JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

alfour declaration
had met Arthur James Balfour for the first time in Manchester,
in 1905. British statesmen, public men, and officials listened
readily to Weizmann because he was able to show that
he could influence Jewish opinion and that Zionism was advantageous
to Britain.
C.P. Scott, the celebrated editor of the Manchester Guardian,
was one of the leading public men whom Weizmann converted
to Zionism. It was Scott who cemented Weizmann’s relationship
with Lloyd George and introduced him to Herbert
*Samuel, then president of the Local Government Board, at
that time the only Jewish member of the cabinet. Like Weizmann,
Samuel realized that Turkey’s entry into the war on November
5, 1914, opened up great possibilities. He went further
than Weizmann and envisaged that, with the probable disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire, the foundation of a Jewish
state in Palestine could be laid. He confided his views first to
Sir Edward Grey, the foreign minister, and found him favorably
disposed towards the idea. Lloyd George was also keen
to see the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine; his interest
predated Grey’s.
However, several weeks later, Samuel concluded that,
since the number of Jews in Palestine did not exceed one-sixth
of the total population, the time was not ripe for the establishment
of an independent and autonomous Jewish state. In
a memorandum circulated in January 1915 (and in a revised
version in March 1915), he advocated the annexation of Palestine
to the British Empire, as only under British rule would
Jewish colonization prosper and immigration be encouraged,
so that in course of time when the Jews would become a majority
they would be conceded “such a degree of self-government
as the conditions of that day may justify.”
On February 5, 1915, when Samuel met Grey again, he
found him still anxious to promote Jewish settlement in Palestine
but very doubtful of the possibility or desirability of the
establishment of a British Protectorate. Neither Samuel nor
Weizmann gave sufficient weight to the fact that Britain was
disinclined to undertake new imperial responsibilities and that
the wishes of the French in that region were to be respected.
The inter-departmental committee, better known as the De
Bunsen Committee, appointed in April 1915, recommended
that maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire, but
with a decentralized system of administration, would serve
British interests best. With regard to Palestine the committee
suggested that it should be neutralized and placed under an
international regime. This concept ran counter to Samuel’s and
Weizmann’s wishes. It was not until early in 1917 that their doctrine
began to appear relevant to British strategic interests. But
during 1915–16 it was still condemned to the sidelines. Weizmann
and Nahum *Sokolow, a member of the World Zionist
Executive who arrived in England in December 1914, pursued
their activity in a low key, and it was only in 1916 that a collection
of essays, edited by Harry *Sacher, entitled Zionism and
the Jewish Future, was published with the intention of enlightening
public opinion on the essence of Zionism.
If the British government’s interest in Zionism persisted,
it was not in order to establish a claim to Palestine, as was
manifested a year later, but in order to win over American
Jewry, whose influence was thought to be considerable in the
press, in finance, and in politics. Wooed by both belligerent
camps, the attitude of the Jews in the United States was governed
by the czarist government’s hostile treatment of their
kin in Russia. The British government regretted Russia’s conduct
but felt powerless to influence her. It was Horace *Kallen,
a professor at the University of Wisconsin and an ardent
Zionist, who first put to the Foreign Office (November 1915)
an alternative method of winning over the American Jews
to the Entente: should the Allies issue a statement similar to
German promises in favor of Jewish national rights in Palestine,
it would, he was convinced, counter German moves
and elicit pro-British and pro-French sympathies among the
Jewish masses.
Independently, a month later, Lucien *Wolf, a journalist
and a historian, then secretary of the Conjoint Foreign Committee
of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and of the Anglo-Jewish
Association, made a similar proposal. Wolf was not
a Zionist and deplored the Jewish national movement. But he
was too much of a realist to ignore the shift in the balance of
power which had taken place since the outbreak of the war.
In America, he conceded, Zionism had captured Jewish opinion,
and in view of the forthcoming American Jewish Congress
he thought it important that “in any bid for Jewish sympathies
… very serious account must be taken of the Zionist
movement … This is the moment for the Allies to declare their
policy in regard to Palestine.” On March 3, 1916, he suggested
a formula as a basis for a public pronouncement.
The Foreign Office was favorably disposed to the idea but
had reservations about Wolf’s eligibility to be the recipient of
such a proclamation. Moreover, doubts later developed as to
whether his suggested formula would make a strong enough
appeal to Jewish communities all over the world.
While the matter was being considered, a rival proposition
came from an unexpected quarter. Its author was Edgar
Suarès, a prominent businessman and head of the Jewish
community in Alexandria. Should the British government
give concrete assurances on the Palestine question, he told Sir
Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner in Egypt, it would
“convert the indifference, if not hostility of American and
other Jews into enthusiastic support.” Suarès’ scheme followed
the familiar Zionist pattern but what made an impact on the
Foreign Office, and particularly on Grey, was the allusion to
the prospect of a German protectorate in Palestine.
On March 11, 1916, Lord Crewe, who was deputizing for
Grey, drafted a cable to the British ambassadors in Paris and
Petrograd asking them to sound out the French and the Russian
governments about making a joint declaration with regard
to Palestine which would satisfy Jewish aspirations. He
quoted Wolf’s formula but suggested instead a scheme which
he thought would be far more attractive to the majority of
Jews. It consisted of creating conditions which would enable
Jewish settlers in Palestine to grow strong enough to cope
86 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Second Edition, Volume 3