JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

with the Arab population and lay the foundation for Jewish
self-government. Neither McMahon nor Grey, nor any other
member of the Foreign Office, saw any inconsistency between
this scheme and the British promise made to Sharif Hussein
of Mecca at that time to recognize Arab independence. It was
understood that, like Lebanon, Palestine was excluded from
the deal.
Against all expectations, Sazonow, the Russian foreign
minister, approved of Grey’s aide-mémoire but Briand, the
French premier and foreign minister, gave it its coup de grâce.
The British gave the French arguments little credence but did
not want to irritate their ally at a time when mutual trust was
of supreme importance. The idea of a joint declaration was
shelved but the need for it did not decrease, especially since
German propaganda in the United States was gaining the upper
hand. The situation was all the more critical since growing
estrangement from England stood in a direct ratio to her
increasing financial dependence on the United States. At this
juncture, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British ambassador to
Washington, remarked: “The Zionist movement is growing
in importance and we can well sympathize with it. Perhaps
here would be a basis of common action.”
With Lloyd George’s accession to the premiership in December
1916, British policy in the Middle East altered radically.
One of his primary objectives was the acquisition of Palestine.
He had advocated its annexation since the outbreak of
the war, and to him British and Jewish Palestine were almost
synonymous. He had a long-standing interest in Zionism and
Samuel’s memorandum made a strong appeal to him. It also
fitted in well with his strategic and political concepts. He had
had no hand in making the *Sykes-Picot Agreement, which
he regarded as an inconvenient legacy. The longer the war
lasted, the stronger became his determination that Palestine,
if recaptured, must be “one and indivisible.”
However, the broader aim of Lloyd George’s policy was
to forestall the possibility of Turco-German predominance in
Palestine. Herein lay the raison dêtre of the alliance with British
Zionism. It provided a way to outmaneuver the French
without breaking faith, and a useful card at the future peace
conference to play against any German move to rally the German-oriented
and Turcophile Jews to buttress her claim.
Late in 1916 the British began to suspect that Germany
was bent on an aggressive course in the East. Events lent support
to this suspicion. The resounding defeat of Serbia by the
German army and Bulgaria’s adherence to the Central Powers
virtually opened the road from Hamburg to Baghdad.
A German foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal
would have placed British imperial communications in grave
jeopardy. In these circumstances destruction of the Ottoman
Empire became an unavoidable necessity. It was also essential
that Palestine come under sole British control. Samuel’s
thesis, expounded in his memoranda of January and March
1915, was now fully vindicated.
However, British strategic requirements clashed with the
principle of non-annexation enunciated by President *Wilson
balfour declaration
and upheld by the Provisional Government in Russia. It constituted
the most serious threat to British war aims. Henceforth,
one of the greatest dilemmas of British diplomacy was
how to achieve its desiderata without giving offense to its
allies. This could be done only by marriage with the principle
of self-determination. It was here that the importance of
Zionism, as far as Palestine was concerned, came in. It provided
a cloak under which Britain could appear free from any
annexationist taint. The anti-Turkish crusade was essentially
negative in nature, and as such could hardly commend itself
to American and Russian opinion; but, when clothed in the
ideological garb of struggle for the liberation of small nationalities,
it acquired a different aspect.
The first step, which was to lead to a compact with
Zionism, was taken by Sir Mark *Sykes, a leading expert on
the East and a signatory to the Agreement with his French
opposite number, François-Georges Picot. His conversion to
Zionism was of particular importance. In January 1917 Lloyd
George promoted him to the key position of assistant secretary
to the war cabinet and delegated authority in Middle
Eastern affairs to him. With his status enhanced he was in a
position to play a major role in shaping British policy in that
part of the world. His crucial meeting with the Zionist leaders,
which included Rabbi Moses *Gaster, Lord Rothschild, Herbert
Samuel, Harry Sacher, as well as Sokolow and Weizmann,
took place on February 7, 1917. He heard from them what he
had expected. The common denominator in the spectrum of
their views was the desire for a British protectorate of Palestine.
This played directly into his hands. He remained silent
about the agreement reached with Picot and Sazonow in
Petrograd in March 1916, but pointed to possible difficulties
from France. He thought it would be useful if the Zionists appointed
a representative to discuss the matter with them. The
representative chosen to put the Zionist point of view to Picot,
then in London, and subsequently to the Quai d’Orsay, was
Sokolow. In the meantime, quite independently, the French
government had changed its policy drastically and, when Sokolow
arrived in Paris, he was told that France took a sympathetic
interest in Jewish national aspirations, which, however,
could be sanctioned only if France had a rightful share in the
administration of Palestine. Nonetheless, Sykes considered it
a step in the right direction. Thereafter, Sykes paved the way
for Sokolow’s visit to the Vatican. On May 1, he was received
by Cardinal Gasparri, the papal secretary of state, who reassured
him that the Zionists need fear no opposition from the
Church. “On the contrary, you may count on our sympathy.”
Pope Benedict XV expressed himself in even warmer terms.
“The return of the Jews to Palestine is a miraculous event. It
is providential; God has willed it … I believe that we shall be
good neighbors.”
Sokolow’s success did not go unnoticed by the Italian
government and on May 8, Di Martino, the secretary-general
of the Foreign Ministry, handed Sokolow an official declaration
of sympathy with Zionist aspirations. Nor did the French
government remain a passive onlooker. On June 4 Jules Cam-
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, Second Edition, Volume 3 87