Festschrift für Fritz W. Scharpf - MPIfG

Héritier · Containing Negative Integration 107
of redistributive goals. This requires that the collective actor favouring redistribution
can gain the support of a veto-player at the central decisionmaking
level, and that the decision-making process at that level occurs on
the basis of a separation of powers and joint decision-making.
How can this general argument be translated into more specific claims in
the context of the provision of public services in the European Union? The
European Union is a decentralized polity in which the member states have a
say in what decisions are made at the central level by an intergovernmental
decision-making body, the Council. Following the above rationale it is unlikely
that the Council will make redistributive decisions in which one
member state gains at the cost of another member state, unless there is pressure
from below and this pressure can be translated into political leverage
by forming an alliance with a formal veto-player at the supranational level.
The EP may be such an alliance partner because under the codecision principle
– which has been extended in the Amsterdam Treaty – it is a formal
veto-player on many matters (Farrell/Héritier 2001). Its preferences are
likely to be in favour of public service goals, because the millions of users
of public utilities are voters. Hence, mobilization from below, successfully
linked to the EP acting as a formal veto-player at supranational level, can
result in the realization of minority redistributive objectives in a sectoral
arena – despite the diversity and decentralization of the European polity.
Political leverage can still be increased if a redistributive issue can be
taken to a cross-sectoral arena, that is, Intergovernmental Conferences
(IGCs) or the European Council. In an open-ended polity such as the European
Union, whose institutional architecture and policies are up for renegotiation
at regular and brief intervals, enormous incentives and opportunities
exist for policy entrepreneurs to launch all kinds of initiatives. Even redistributive
minority issues, if launched in cross-sectoral arenas along the vertical
channel previously described, may then become subjects of horizontal
negotiations and – because of the unanimity rule – stand a chance of becoming
included in a package, issue linkage or compensation deal.
Finally, market-correcting policy objectives may be linked to changed
preferences of hierarchical actors. In contrast to the Council, the hierarchical
decision-makers in the European polity, both the Commission and the ECJ,
can impose decisions. Both the Commission, using infringement procedures
and directives under Art. 86.2 TEC, and the Court, using preliminary rulings
and adjudication, can achieve market-correcting policy goals if they so
wish. Thus far, however, the two actors have predominantly pursued market-creation
goals.