Festschrift für Fritz W. Scharpf - MPIfG

108 II · Politik und Demokratie in Europa
The general argument, then, leads to one descriptive and two explanatory
claims. First, the descriptive claim is simply that if the Commission and the
ECJ choose to pursue market-correcting policy goals and they will be able
to achieve them, because of their decision-making rights. Second, the explanatory
claim from the perspective of “mobilization from below” asserts
that if minority actors and political actors at a lower level exert pressure and
are able to form a coalition with an institutional veto-player at the higher
level, e.g. with the EP, market-correcting policies may be realized. And
third, taking a redistributive issue to a cross-sectoral arena (like an IGC or
the European Council) improves the chances of redistributive issues being
included in the bargaining because the range of issues is drastically widened.
4 The Hypotheses in the Light of Recent Empirical
Developments
4.1 The Hierarchy Claim
It has been argued that the Commission and the ECJ, by virtue of their legislative
powers, can impose their policy objectives relatively easily since
their decision-making costs are low compared to those that accrue in intergovernmental
decisions in the Council or in inter-institutional decisions under
the codecision procedure of the Council and the EP. Given the prevalence
of negative integration preferences in the Commission and the ECJ in
the past, the question arises whether the Commission and the Court, as hierarchical
players, have in the past pursued market-correcting policy objectives.
Of course, it is not possible in this context to present exhaustive empirical
evidence on the policy preferences of the two actors in the sectors
under scrutiny. But illustrative evidence can be provided that indicates that
the two hierarchical actors, the Commission and the Court, pursue not solely
market integration, but also redistributive goals in the network industries. So
the rather modest expectation is that, alongside the competition-enhancing
policy preferences of the two actors, pro-service public preferences can be
identified as well. The empirical focus is restricted here to the liberalization
of the railway, telecommunications, postal services and energy sectors.
Turning to the Commission first, market-correcting preferences may be
identified at both a general and a sectoral level. In a cross-sectoral view, the