Festschrift für Fritz W. Scharpf - MPIfG

126 II · Politik und Demokratie in Europa
not fully elaborated in Governing in Europe. Second, we seek to show that
this omission leaves the case for output legitimacy open to a series of hypothetical
objections. In particular, any such analysis must address three fundamental
problems of democratic theory: the status of uninformed or inexpert
citizens in a complex world, the problem of underlying biases in
democratic representation, and the issue of how to define the proper scope
of majoritarian decision-making. Third, and fully in the spirit of the concerns
raised in Governing in Europe, we offer two possible strategies for
addressing these concerns and suggest some tools for rethinking output legitimacy
and its relation both to the “public interest” and to participatory
procedures. As scholars and social scientists explore these lines of analysis,
the research agenda on democratic legitimacy in Europe implicitly sketched
by Scharpf is likely to be a lively one for some time to come.
1 What Is the “Public Interest”?
Scharpf launches Governing in Europe by presenting two conceptions of legitimacy.
The first is “input legitimacy.” For Scharpf, input legitimacy or
“government by the people” requires that collective decisions “reflect the
general will” as articulated in widely participatory procedures. Starting from
a justification of majority rule, the central obstacle confronting any “inputbased”
argument is to explain why the minority should accept the decision
of a majority, given that everyone’s interests must be given equal consideration.
Empirically, Scharpf continues, input legitimacy therefore requires
that there must be a high level of civic trust and solidarity, which, if generally
recognized, will provide assurance to everyone that their interests are
being taken into account. This will make it more likely that minorities will
not only acquiesce (out of fear, for example) but also accept that the majority
has the legitimate authority to enact their program in the form of generally
binding law. Scharpf does not explore this notion in greater detail, but
rather appears to follow Joseph Weiler and others in assuming that acceptance
of majority opinion must rest on a deep normative sense of identity
and that, in general, such trust is provided by a shared common conception
of history, fate, memory, constitution, and nation. 4 Where political argu-
4 Scharpf (1999: 7–10). It is worth noting here that this restrictive conception of “input” legitimacy,
which links closely with thick identity, is hardly unproblematic. There are a