Russel-Research-Method-in-Anthropology

Anthropology and the Social Sciences 9
Bacon and Descartes
Two other figures are often cited as founders of modern scientific thinking:
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650). Bacon is
known for his emphasis on induction, the use of direct observation to confirm
ideas and the linking together of observed facts to form theories or explanations
of how natural phenomena work. Bacon correctly never told us how to
get ideas or how to accomplish the linkage of empirical facts. Those activities
remain essentially humanistic—you think hard.
To Bacon goes the dubious honor of being the first ‘‘martyr of empiricism.’’
In March 1626, at the age of 65, Bacon was driving through a rural area north
of London. He had an idea that cold might delay the biological process of
putrefaction, so he stopped his carriage, bought a hen from a local resident,
killed the hen, and stuffed it with snow. Bacon was right—the cold snow did
keep the bird from rotting—but he himself caught bronchitis and died a month
later (Lea 1980).
Descartes didn’t make any systematic, direct observations—he did neither
fieldwork nor experiments—but in his Discourse on Method (1960 [1637])
and particularly in his monumental Meditations (1993 [1641]), he distinguished
between the mind and all external material phenomena—matter—and
argued for what is called dualism in philosophy, or the independent existence
of the physical and the mental world. Descartes also outlined clearly his vision
of a universal science of nature based on direct experience and the application
of reason—that is, observation and theory. (For more on Descartes’s influence
on the development of science, see Schuster 1977, Markie 1986, Hausman and
Hausman 1997, and Cottingham 1999.)
Newton
Isaac Newton (1643–1727) pressed the scientific revolution at Cambridge
University. He invented calculus and used it to develop celestial mechanics
and other areas of physics. Just as important, he devised the hypotheticodeductive
model of science that combines both induction (empirical observation)
and deduction (reason) into a single, unified method (Toulmin 1980).
In this model, which more accurately reflects how scientists actually conduct
their work, it makes no difference where you get an idea: from data, from
a conversation with your brother-in-law, or from just plain, hard, reflexive
thinking. What matters is whether you can test your idea against data in the
real world. This model seems rudimentary to us now, but it is of fundamental
importance and was quite revolutionary in the late 17th century.