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spartans_in_darkness

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EO:(d)<br />

i~t::: i~~<br />

fOP SEeREfh'eeMlffTi'J''C:l<br />

(rSl/SI) The next few years proved difficult<br />

for the V.S. SIGINT mission <strong>in</strong> Thailand. The<br />

Thais were always sensitive to the political ramifications<br />

of a large American presence <strong>in</strong> their<br />

country and sought to keep it at a m<strong>in</strong>imum. In<br />

future negotiations with the Thais, the V.S. cryptologic<br />

leadership usually deferred to the views of<br />

the V.S. ambassador <strong>in</strong> Bangkok, whose ability to<br />

sense what the Thais wanted was the most important<br />

element <strong>in</strong> anv future relationshipl<br />

(V) l/dorn site berate construction started <strong>in</strong> 1965<br />

Thailand.l'" In fact, a permanent site <strong>in</strong> that<br />

country was not agreed upon until 1965, when<br />

Udorn (Udon Thani), located <strong>in</strong> the north central<br />

part of the country, which had served as a small<br />

<strong>in</strong>tercept station for the fledgl<strong>in</strong>g AFSC, was<br />

picked as the major American SIGINT site <strong>in</strong><br />

Thailand. Eventually, Udorn would become the<br />

only site <strong>in</strong> Southeast Asia after the American<br />

withdrawal from South Vietnam <strong>in</strong> 1973.<br />

* * * *<br />

EO<br />

1.4. (c)<br />

(Tel/eI) The problem with the Thailand site<br />

was not <strong>in</strong> what it produced, but it what it could<br />

not provide: coverage of the grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgency<br />

<strong>in</strong>side South Vietnam and the current, tactical<br />

military situation <strong>in</strong> Laos. Additionally, there was<br />

little prospect for immediate and substantial<br />

growth, both <strong>in</strong> size and capabilities, especially <strong>in</strong><br />

the all-critical D/F mission, of the field site <strong>in</strong><br />

CV) Ironically, despite the years of observ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the grow<strong>in</strong>g threat from <strong>in</strong>ternal opposition<br />

sources and Viet M<strong>in</strong>h guerrillas, the USlVIAA.G <strong>in</strong><br />

Saigon rema<strong>in</strong>ed conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the real threat to<br />

the Republic of Vietnam was by, cross-border<br />

attack from the DRV. In the mid-1950s, the then<br />

Commander USMAA.G, Lieutenant General John<br />

O'Daniel, considered the ma<strong>in</strong> threat to South<br />

Vietnam to be a conventional force <strong>in</strong>vasion from<br />

the north. In 1956, O'Daniel envisioned three<br />

possible attacks routes: across the seventeenth<br />

parallel with Hue and Tourane (Danang) the<br />

major targets, through Laos and east across the<br />

Central Highlands on the Kontum-Pleiku-Qui<br />

Page 78

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