spartans_in_darkness

Teli SEeREli'/eSMI'HHX1
(V) Mqrine cryptcloqists man defensive positions
around PFJU Bqi circa 1964.
2. ARVN agreed to provide suitable land area
to accommodate the detachment's buildings to be
constructed, as well as the necessary antenna
fields.
3. The 3d RRU agreed to consult with local
officials and ensure that any construction did not
interfere with air traffic around Phu Bai airport.
4. ARVN agreed to provide adequate security
around the periphery base area.
5. The commander,
USMACV, agreed that results
accruing from the execution of
the detachment's mission, and
which may have been of value
to the government of Vietnam,
would be provided to the GVN
in the prescribed manner.l''"
(TS//SI) This agreement
solved the American concerns
about foreign access to the site,
as well as the technical
exchange program with the
ARVN, since DIRNSA, in the
meantime, had relented on his
earlier, draconian restrictions.
Ironically, Phu Bai presented a new security
problem from the MACV perspective - the fear of
the site being overrun by a conventional attack
from the north, either by DRV or Chinese communist
military forces.'" NSAPAC saw the VC as
a threat to the base's safety, commenting in early
1963 that it was "virtually in Viet Cong camp
grounds and subject to any type scrutiny that they
might wish to make." 144 In fact, the area around
Phu Bai was known for its heavy VC activity,
which included ambushes of ARVN patrols, closure
of roads and railways, attacks on local police
t,
(V) Wire barricade
around
Phu Bai under
construction,
October 1964
Page 152
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