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showed an ability to adapt tactics and command
structures to changes introduced by the other."
CU) However, when viewed in terms of clashes
between different aircraft, the results of the air
combat come into better focus. For most of the
Rolling Thunder campaign, from June 1965 when
the first aircraft tangled, until December 1967,the
U.S. Air Force and Navy downed 109 Vietnamese
aircraft. However, of those shot down, only twenty-five
were MiG-21s. During the same period, the
MiG-21s shot down twenty-six American jets.
From August to December 1967, Hanoi's air force
turned the tables on the Americans: the U.S. lost
thirteen jets to Hanoi's twelve; more importantly,
MiG-21s shot down twelve to the loss of only one.
Into the next year and right up to the cessation of
Rolling Thunder in March 1968, the U.S. lost aircraft
to the MiG-21 at a rate in excess of 3:1. 32
CU) Despite Hanoi's best efforts, though, overall
American aerial superiority was never in
doubt. The best the Vietnamese could hope for
was to contest the skies over a bombing target.
The presence of MiGs could cause fighterbombers
to drop their ordnance in order to meet
the immediate threat. Though this seldom happened
to an entire strike force, it diverted many
strike aircraft away from their primary missions
in order to counter the MiG threat.
CU) In March 1965, when Rolling Thunder
began, the opposing forces were hardly ready for
the tasks confronting them. The U.S., on paper,
seemed to have an overwhelming advantage in
aircraft and technical capabilities. At the height of
Rolling Thunder, the U.S. could count on
upwards of 400 advanced combat aircraft,
backed by a sophisticated command and control
system, aerial refuelling, expert maintenance,
and a large Search and Rescue CSAR) effort. But
the effort was plagued by a number of organizational
and doctrinal problems.
(S//SI) The U.S. forces were divided into a
number of commands, each of which exercised
lOP 5E6RElN60MINlUK1
control over its aircraft and tactics. The largest
was the 7th Air Force (known originally as the
2nd Air Division) whose tactical fighter wings
staged from various bases throughout Thailand.
The 7th Air Force's headquarters was at Tan Son
Nhut Air Base near Saigon, but it had a tactical
Control and Reporting Post CCRP) on Monkey
Mountain at Danang next to the detachment from
the 6924th Security Squadron. Almost from the
beginning, the AFSS group on the mountain
would share SIGINT with the CRP. 3 : J
(SHSI) Early in the air war, the 7th Air Force
discovered that SIGINT revealing North
Vietnamese countermeasures to its SAM suppression
missions was not getting to its operations
planners in a timely basis. The result was
that certain Wild Weasel and Iron Hand missions
were ineffective in destroying SAM batteries and
their associated Fan Song and Fire Can radars.
The information was readily available, but it just
was not getting to the 7th AF planners. There
were several layers of intervening SIGIl\Il elements
and organizations that handled the information
first, as well as sanitization procedures
which slowed down the delivery of the intelligence.
(~//~I) Bythe end of 1965, 7th AF intelligence
analysts listed their concerns which boiled down
to the fact that SIGINT was unavailable for the
daily tactical briefs on the status of the North
Vietnamese air force and air defense systems.
NSA agreed that there was a problem and suggested
it could be solved by augmenting the staff
at the NRV with about a dozen personneLl
(S//SI) However, the 7th AFwas not buying
this solution. The 7th Air Force's director of intelligence,
Brigadier General Rocky Triantafellu,
wanted an Air-Force-only manned intelligence
center that would fuse all intelligence sources.
General Triantafellu insisted that the center be
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