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lep SESRHNSeMI~ln'*1
Vietnamese; they would be on the lookout for
possible new attacks. The question was, though,
was Hanoi spoiling for another round with the
C.S. Navy
(V) Interlude: Maneuvers and
Watchfulness, 3 August
(U) On 3 August, President Johnson made
public the instructions he had issued earlier to the
Navy. He said that the patrols would continue in
the Gulf of Tonkin, that they would be reinforced
by another destroyer with combat aircraft overhead.
He added that if attacked in international
waters, U.S. forces would attack any force with
the intention of not just driving it off, but of
"destroying it."
(U) At the same time, the State Department
publicized the note it had sent Hanoi protesting
the attacks. It concluded with the words "The
United States Government expects that the
authorities ofthe regime in North Vietnam will be
under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences
which would inevitably result from any
further unprovoked military action against the
United States forces." 70
(U) Despite the increased North Vietnamese
vigilance and the observed sensitivity to
American and South Vietnamese naval activity in
Hanoi's territorial waters, COMUSMACV went
ahead with an OPLAN 34A mission scheduled for
the night of 3-4 August. In accordance with an
earlier agreement, the Maddox and Turner Joy
were advised to avoid sailing in the area bounded
by the 17th and 18th parallels. A 34A mission
against the radar site at Vinh Son (l7"57'N,
106°30'E), which involved a four-boat task group,
set sail at 1510G (081OZ) on 3 August. At midnight
it shelled the radar station. One of the boats
broke off and attacked a nearby security post and
was pursued for a short distance by a North
Vietnamese patrol craft.
(U) By mid-morning of 3 August the two
destroyers were heading to their patrol station,
which was about 100 miles northwest of the new
34A mission area. They expected to be on station
by early afternoon. However, this location kept
them in the area of the island of Hon Me, which
was the focus of DRV naval activity during the
ensuing day and night.
(8//81) Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese
were concerned with the salvage of their damaged
boats. Just past midnight on 3 August, T-142 and
T-146 were in the area of Hon Me Island trying to
contact another Swatow, T-165, as well as find
the missing boats from Squadron 135. At 0300G
(2000Z), T-142 sent an after-action report to the
T-146 (for relay to Port Wallut), which highlighted
the previous afternoon's combat. It included a
detailed chronology of the various actions the
squadron's boats carried out from 0935G to
""1
1625G when they attacked the Maddox.'
(8//8I) Even by mid-afternoon of 3 August,
naval headquarters in Haiphong still did not
know where the torpedo boats were and demanded
that the Swatows inform it when they knew
their situation." However, the SIGINT site at Phu
Bai misconstrued this search and salvage activity
as a prelude to a potentially dangerous concentration
of enemy boats. It issued a Critic at 1656G
(0956Z), which placed six DRV patrol and torpedo
boats near Hon Me Island. 73 However, the
report was wrong in that it identified the
squadron reference "135" as a boat, as well as
locating the two torpedo boats, which, at the time,
were still missing. The ominous concentration of
boats simply was not occurring. However, this
incident revealed how tense the situation had
become. It also established a precedent by the
field site at Phu Bai for misinterpreting Hanoi's
intentions.
(TSl/S!) Almost as soon as the two destroyers
arrived on station south ofHon Me Island in early
afternoon, they were shadowed by a DRV patrol
boat which tracked them using its Skin Head
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