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report of the NSA series, three towns in
Pleiku province - Le Thanh, Due Co, and
Tan Lap - are listed as targets that must be
taken. However, the reports mention other
objectives near other urban centers, which
suggests that the latter were only reference
points. For example, Follow-up 4 states the
ARVN 51st Regiment near Danang is to be
attacked, while Follow-up 6 informs us that
the bridge at Dien Binh is to be covered by a
unit. At other cities, like Chu Ba and La
Thanh, ambushes were to be set up by units
to attack American or ARVN units which
may move to counter the assaults.F" The
number of cities and villages listed in the
pre-Tet reporting was minuscule: perhaps a
dozen, compared to the number actually
attacked - almost ninety in the period from
30 January to 7 February.
Tet Offensive
Major Cities
and
MHitary Bases
Attacked
January 30- February 3. 1968
.
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('fSl/Sf) If we look at the number of
provinces in which the attacks are to occur,
the picture that emerges suggests less than a
country-wide offensive. When the information
from the reports is tallied, there are only
eight provinces mentioned in the NSAreport
series for which attacks are planned. They
are concentrated in two regions: northern
part of CTZ 1, which includes the
Demilitarized Zone, Khe Sanh, Hue, and
Danang, as well as the western Central
Highlands, in particular Pleiku and Kontum.
Viet Cong activity reported in two further
provinces in the Nam Bo - Bien Hoa and Phuc
Long - was regarded as only "possibly related" in
the NSA report Even if we include these latter
provinces, we still can count only ten provinces.
The provinces around Saigon and in the Mekong
Delta region are never mentioned in any of the
reports. Yet, attacks occurred in thirty-eight of
forty-four South Vietnamese provinces during the
initial period of the Tet attacks.
(TSl/Sf) The only indicator remaining is the
"N-Day" reference. As mentioned earlier, this
indicator should be the one which defines the Tet
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(V) Maior attacks in South Vietnam during Tet
reporting. The other five could be tentative, fragmentary,
or conflicting; SIGINT could be getting
only nibbles around the "big picture." On the
other hand, the mention of a starting day (and
possibly time) should be unambiguous, especially
if widely separated units refer to it. However,
when we look at all the reports, even the nature of
the "N-Day" indicator becomes contentious. First
of all, more than one possible "N-Day" is mentioned;
as many as three could be construed from
the report series. The first report itself leaves
open the possibility of "N-Day" occurring on the
night of 25-26 January.P" Follow-up 2, issued on
28 January, only suggests that the attack would
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