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figures from the previous two months. As one
intelligence officer said, "If we had gotten the
whole battle plan, it would have not been
believed. It would not have been credible to us."
84 On 5 January, the Joint United States Public
Affairs Office released part of the captured plan.
One reporter, looking at it, could only mutter
"moonshine." 85
(S//Si) All of this is not to suggest that
Westmoreland and the others were oblivious to
the intelligence piling up on their desks.
However, the military situation that developed in
the northern part of South Vietnam, especially
near the DMZ, soon held the attention of the
Americans. A 23 December NSAreport suggested
that PAVN unit movements into the provinces
near and south of Danang indicated that a possible
offensive activi would start there soon. 8 6
'--
----IA State Department assessment
from 6 January carried the same conclusion
that the communists were preparing a major
offensive in the northern region of the country/"
(V) ByJanuary, the communist military activity
along the borders seemed to have spent itself.
However, ominous new movements were detected
in Quang Tri Province. PAVN units seemed to
be concentrating around a small marine base
near Route 9 just under twenty-five kilometers
from the border with Laos. Soon everyone's
attention would be riveted to that base to the
exclusion of everything else. Its name was Khe
Sanh.
(U) The Fulcrum ofOur Vision:
The Siege ofKhe Sanh and Its Effect
on American Intelligence
(V) Khe Sanh, in western Quang Tri Province,
sits astride the old French Colonial Route 9 which
connects the Vietnamese coast with the trad
centers of Laos and the central Mekong region.
1962, the V.S. Special Forces had set up a base
the area and trained local irregular forces for f
ays into the nearby eastern portions of the Ho (
Minh Trail. The marines' first experience at 1<
Sanh occurred in April 1967. Ever since i
marines had taken over responsibility for seer
ty in the I CTZ, they had been steadily expand
westward along Route 9 towards Laos. By ea
1967, they had arrived at the town of Khe Sa
and began to build a military base and airfield j
to the north of it. In late April a regiment from.
PAVN 325C Division sent in advance units
seize the hills northwest of the marine airfie
The 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Divisiwith
heavy artillery and air support, drove out
Vietnamese after two weeks of close fighti
blasting them from bunkers and other prepai
positions in combat that was reminiscent of
Pacific island campaign in World War II.
(S//SI) Beginning in late October a
throughout the rest of 1967, SIGINT detected f
ments of another communist buildup in the er
ern portion of Laos across from Khe Sanh. T
regiments of the PAVN 304th Division w
heard in communications as they massed ale
Route 9 in Laos. The 304th had been steac
moving south from its base in the southern DI
By mid-December, the divisional headquart
was located near Tchepone, Laos. 8 9 At the sa
time, just north of these two regiments, other E
ments of the 304th and another PAVN divisi
the 320th, were located through D/F. Along w
the divisions, there existed a new headquart
unit controlling them. This "High Cornmar
seemed to now be responsible for activity wes
Quang Tri Province."
(S//Si) If the presence of elements from i
divisions was not ominous enough, in es
January 1968 two regiments from the PA
325C Division, the division the marines I
scrapped with in April, were detected by Dil
regions north and west of Khe Sanh. Meanwh
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