spartans_in_darkness

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there had been a change in the Vietnamese treatment
of the prisoners to the better, perceptible
even to the paws themselves. Overall conditions
and treatment meted out by the North
Vietnamese had ameliorated, though there still
were short stretches of brutality against some
prisoners. It is not clear exactly why conditions
had gotten better; a host of factors seem involved:
the death of Ho Chi Minh, a U.S. publicity campaign
highlighting pow maltreatment, and the
unexpected deaths of some paws. Whatever the
causes(s), the situation for the prisoners had gotten
measurably better."
(U) It should be pointed out that pow rescue
raids were not new to the Indochina War.
Although exact statistics are not available, it is
estimated that somewhere around forty to fortyeight
rescues of American and Allied prisoners
were attempted between 1966 to 1970. However,
while dozens of South Vietnamese were freed,
only one American was ever rescued, and he died
shortly afterward.l"
(U) What was different about the proposed
raid at Son Tay was the location of
the camp - just twenty miles west
of Hanoi - and the estimated
number of paws - maybe as
many as fifty-five. The Pentagon
knew that there were prisoners at
Son Tay; during aerial reconnaissance
flights over the camp in mid­
1969, paws had used surreptitious
methods to signal their presence
to the planes." However,
despite its proximity to Hanoi, the
camp was considered vulnerable.
It was isolated, and sitting on the
bank of a branch of the Red River,
easily cut off. But this was not to
say that Son Tay was safe. The
nearby town hosted a number of
military installations and facilities,
such as signal troop and antiaircraft
training schools, as well as a
jet-capable airfield. There were thousands of
North Vietnamese military personnel in the area.
(U) In April of 1970, planning for the rescue
mission began. Byearly May, a special USAFunit
picked up the effort, and in the next month produced
follow-on and feasibility studies. Ultimate
responsibility for the raid was given to the newly
created Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG)
under the command of Brigadier General Roy
Manor. The final plan called for a wave oflow-flying
helicopters to stage from Udorn Royal Thai
Air Force Base (RTAFB), Thailand, refuel over
Laos, and then dash in on the camp. The raid also
was to be supported by almost sixty USAFcraft in
escort and support roles (including SIGINT), and
another fifty-nine USN strike aircraft which carried
out diversionary air strikes near the Gulf of
Tonkin.
(8//81) SIGINT was not brought into the
planning until 10 August 1970, when the JCS
requested CINCPAC to assign a a SIGINT representative
to the JCTG. The head of SIGINT
Support Group to the Pacific Air Force's (PACAF)
(V) Son Tay compound
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