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of forty-three men. Diem approved the additions."
In January 1962, the marines would finally
be deployed in Southeast Asia on a temporary
mission designed to last three months. In that
month a detachment from the 1st COMRADCO
arrived in South Vietnam. They set up at Pleiku in
the Central Highlands (USN-414T), and were collocated
with an ARVN intercept and DIF site
which, itself, was part of the Whitebirch net (and
were supported by three men from the 3rd RRU).
The marines spent most of their time training and
acclimating themselves to the communications
environment. Usually about three officers and
forty-five or so enlisted personnel were stationed
there, rotating every four months from the field
with replacements from the parent company in
Hawaii. The unit manned five manual morse and
radiotelephone intercept positions, collecting
Cambodian, North Vietnamese, and Laotian
communications. The marines received their
technical support from the ASA and coordinated
intercept missions with the existing army sites."
(8//80 By March 1962, the 3rd RRU had
evaluated the marines' performance and reported
back to DIRNSA. The ASA suggested that if the
marines were to be extended past their initial
120-day mission, their site should be moved to
the Danang area and be assigned a mission in
support of the effort by the army intercept site in
the Philippines. It was determined that the
Marine Corps effort at Pleiku mostly duplicated
that of Army's at Phu Bai. Furthermore, it was
noted that the resulting intercept was below the
standards of Bien Hoa in terms of quantity and
quality. 73
(8//80 Late in 1963, the marines shifted their
base from the mountainous Central Highlands at
Pleiku to the newly established station at Phu Bai
near Hue where they moved in with the ASA.
There they worked with ASA personnel who
trained the marines in TIA and intercept of communist
communications. As the marine expertise
grew, the detachment took on new missions with
emphasis on the DRV naval communications,
including Hanoi's coastal surveillance radar network
and the tactical command and control of its
small navy of patrol craft and torpedo boats.
Eventually, marine operators would work with
the expanding ARDF program and the KIT KAT
SIGINT support project for OPLt\N 34A mis­
SIOns.
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