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1.4. (d)
(S//SI) Another problem was the poor technical
background of many students, which should
have been anticipated considering the nature of
Vietnamese schooling and culture. This led to
sometimes steep washout ratesapproaching 60
percent for some classes. This technical gap also
limited the number of students who could take
courses in critical and highly technical subjects
like crypto-equipment maintenance: By1969, the
Sabertooth program was closed down. Overall,
Sabertooth never seemed to achieve, the success
hoped for it when it began in 1961. 3 6
(V) Sabertooth trainlnq. V.S. ilnd ARVN operators
working with an AN/TRD-4A set
There were forty-five students in that first set of
classes, thirty for the intercept-DjF course and
fifteen for the traffic analysis section. By
November 1961,thirty-one students had graduated
from these courses.
(8//81) However, from its very beginning,
Sabertooth was bedeviled by problems which
undercut its effectiveness. The biggest difficulty
lay in obtaining adequate numbers of qualified
personnel and getting them over the administrative
hurdles. For example, in June 1962, 120 students
were slated for training, but were placed on
hold because they lacked security clearances. At
other times, classes were cancelled or never
scheduled; not one class was held for the entire
year of 1966! Most other times, only one or two
full classes could be scheduled. In early 1962, the
program was turned over to the Vietnamese to
administer while the 3rd RRU remained in an
advisory capacity.
ES/I~a) There were other fundamental problems
with Vietnamese COMINT that would keep
it from being the effective program the Americans
had wanted. One major drawback was the organization
of Vietnamese cryptology. Subordinate
units were a mixed bag of COMINT and COMSEC
technicians with conflicting pay and promotion
policies. Also, the COMINT organization was in
competition with other Vietnamese military
branches for the limited number of technically
inclined recruits. Finally, the current organization
of the communications intelligence units,
which was geared towards fixed site operations,
did not lend itself to field support for mobile military
operations. To rectify this latter problem,\
the 3rd RRU proposedI
COMINT units be reorganized along ASAlines. 3 7
(8//81) In late 1962, the Technical Center was
renamed the Technical Exploitation Organization
(TEO) which functioned as an analytic and joint
operations command. Subordinate to it was Unit
15, the Communications Technical Research
Company (CTRC), which was the COMINT
organization. The COMSEC function was
renamed Unit 16 and temporarily shifted to the
ARVN Telecommunications Command. There it
performed cryptographic support functions and
COMSEC monitoring operations. Eventually, the
COMSEC unit would be returned to the cryptologic
fold in 1964.
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