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such as deception and changes in communications
procedures. This was due, in large measure,
to the ability of individual intercept operators and
analysts in detecting them. Furthermore, the
impressive exactitude in targeting those critical
North Vietnamese communications that tipped
off MiG activity was equally important. There was
little that the DRVair defense personnel could do
to overcome the vulnerabilities in their MiG command
and control system: the flights of the MiGs
had to be tipped off to the SAMbatteries, and the
MiGs could not operate without the direction
from tactical air communications. The true
strength and value of Teaball was the SIGINT
coverage it provided. However, Teaball remained
vulnerable to the two problems that plagued SIG­
INT support throughout the air war: administrative
strictures and technical difficulties with the
command, control, and communications system.
(SHS!) Both problems affected how the SIG­
INT could get to the pilots. Administrative
restrictions, employed by both the regular Air
Force and the cryptologists, kept ephemeral tactical
SIGINT information from arriving in a timely
manner, if at all. By the time Teaball had arrived,
the shortcoming of these limitations had been
realized by both the Air Force and NSA, though
their influence did not completely fade.
(8//81) The larger, and ultimately intractable,
problem for SIGINT was that of the faulty C3. In
1965 Hammock, even without the need for sanitization
of the SIGINT, could supply information
only in a matter of several minutes. Bythe time of
Teaball in 1972, even though the times had
improved dramatically, the C3 shortcomings
were still paramount. The kluge of systems that
constituted Teaballleft too many points of failure
- it was completely down or degraded 47 percent
of the time. The only saving grace for American
pilots was that the individual control systems,
such as Disco and Red Crown, could operate individually
and effectively even when Teaball was
out of commission.
(D) As long as the delivery of SIGINT information
to the pilots was limited, either through
administrative or technical barriers, the best it
could be was as an adjunct to the air war. The
larger problem of an effective C3I system for air
combat would be solved in a few years with the
arrival of the E-3A (Sentry) Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. What this
single platform did was to remove all intermediate
steps in the control of air combat. Its presence
could nearly guarantee complete air supremacy,
as the examples over Lebanon and the Persian
Gulf illustrated. No longer would several systems
compete for control of a campaign. The ridiculous
example of Teaball and Red Crown controllers
bumping each other off of the command frequency
as the air situation changed would become a
thing of memory.
(U)Notes
1. CD) Schulzinger, 155-159.
2. CD) Karnow, 405.
3. ('f8//8I) DIRNSA 021540Z August 1964,
08006/02 SIGINT Readiness Bravo Lantern; DIRN­
SA, 3/01 ~18-64, SIGINT Readiness Bravo
Lantern Declared 042058Z August 1964;
3/0~ f03-64 7 August 1964, inter alia.
4. CD) Van Staaveren, 40.
5. CD) VandeMark, 35.
6. CD) Ibid.
7. CD) Karnow, 411.
12. (8//81) 2/0/VHK/R2-64, 25 September 1964,
45539Z.
13. (8//81) 2/0/VCK-E/R97-70, December 1970.
14. (8//81) Thompson, DandGerhard, 27.
15. (T8//81) Ibid., 28.
16. (T8//8I) Ibid., 29.
17. CD) Gaddy, 122-123.
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