spartans_in_darkness

Tep SEeRETlleeMINTHX1
('fSl/SI) For example, the first summary,
"R01," issued early on 5 August, contained this
section which strongly suggests that the Desoto
patrol was surveyed by DRV aircraft. The entry
read:
During 3 August, DRV Naval Communications
reflected the tracking and shadowing of the two
destroyers throughout the day; this activity was
reported by both destroyers. They were also
apparently shadowed by two presumably DRV
aircraft. A DRVmerchant ship advised its shipping
office in Haiphong that 'two bombers'
would 'fly' in the direction of the ship and investigate.
No further identification of the aircraft
id d 171
was pro'll e .
(T£//£I) This entry was lifted from a San
Miguel report on DRVmerchant shipping. In it, a
single North Vietnamese merchant ship, the
Thong Nhat, reported that two single-propeller
aircraft (chong chongs), and not bombers, were
flying to investigate the ship, presumably a reference
to itself. 172 Hanoi's aircraft inventory contained
two single-prop planes - the AN-2 (Colt),
a small transport biplane and the YAK-18 (Max)
trainer - both of which were unsuitable to maritime
patrols. Since the report never specified the
nationality of the aircraft, it is likely that they
were American A-IH single propeller fighter
bombers from the Ticonderoga.
(Sl/SI) At the time of the intercept, 1018Z on
3 August, the Desoto patrol was some sixty miles
to the south of the Thong Nhat; it seems reasonable
that the Desoto combat air patrol would have
gone to investigate the North Vietnamese
freighter.F" A few hours after the Thong Nhat
reported the aircraft, the Haiphong shipping
office transmitted an urgent message to three
DRVmerchant ships to "take precautions against
enemy airplanes and ships." 174
(T£/f£1) In addition, the third report, "R03,"
refers to intercept at 1054Z on 4 August that the
DRV was trying to keep "activities under cover"
when it was claimed that it had intercepted a
message with the sentence "YOU CANNOT PUB­
LICIZE THE SITUATION OF THE BOATS OF
FLOTILLA 135TO THE BACH DANG." 175 Who is
sending this message, and to whom, is not mentioned
in the summary. To date, the source of this
sentence has not been found; its context, the correctness
of the translation, or even its correlation
to the attack, cannot be determined.
(T~//~I) Report "R03" also carried another
curious entry supporting the idea of an attack.
This read "KHOAI HAD MET THE ENEMY."
Over the ensuing years this entry bothered people
researching the incident. No one could find the
original intercept, and no one could seem to
explain it. 176 No wonder. The sentence was a
rewrite of a San Miguel intercept. The original
intercept was of a message from Haiphong to T­
146, which originally read: "WHEN ((YOU))
MEET THE ENEMY T333 MUST MOBILIZE."
Since the local time of the intercept is 0211G
(2011Z) on 5 August, the reference to meeting the
enemyhas nothing to do with the prior evening's
incident. In fact, the tense of the original translation
suggests that this was a message anticipating
a possible future clash with the Americans, and it
was expected that torpedo boat T-333 had to be
ready to defend itself." The name "KHOAI" was
seen in other intercepts over the prior two days,
including the infamous "military operations" one
of early 4 August. In reality, "KHO.!\I" probably
was Le Duy Khoai, the commander of Squadron
135. That he, the commanding officer, accompanied
Section 3 in its attack against the Maddox on
2 August, and stayed on to supervise the recovery
operations of his two damaged boats, was standard
procedure for DRV naval officers.'"
(TS//SI) The main NSA effort at producing a
record of the events of 2-5 August 1964 centered
on a joint postmortem with the Defense
Intelligence Agency, begun in late August 1964
and released on 14 October 1964. What was produced
was a chronology of events which supported
the contention that there had been a second
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