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plot the tracking information.P" Yet, this issue of
primary intercept platform would be revisited.
(5//5I) More problems plagued Teaball. The
main communications platform, an Air Force KC­
135 radio relay aircraft, known by its callword,
Luzon, had to have its operating altitude changed
in order to include all of the stations on the network.
The mission orbits of both Combat Apple
and Olympic Torch had to be reconfigured from
I
Ito out in the Tonkin Gulf. Plans to
put Linebacker operations on a twenty-four-hour
tempo threatened to wear out the meager supply
of AFSS linguists and analysts available to man
the airborne missions and the TWCC. 131
(S//Sl) Teaball finally was ready for operations
on 29 July when it was supposed to support
a scheduled Linebacker operation. However,
General Vogt held back his approval until 31 July.
Even then, there was a hold-up as the many
teething problems mentioned above were ironed
out. In the meantime, Teaball personnel worked
only when an! Olympic Torch mission was in orbit
during a Linebacker operation, and, then, they
did work only on post-strike summaries.F" At the
same time, an evaluation of the time needed to
pass the warnings to the MiGCAP aircraft
through Disco showed that it still was taking too
long to get the messages through the system. The
downlink from Olympic Torch proved more fragile
than anticipated and failed several times.
When that collection mission was not up, the
backup communications between Combat Apple
I
~ere inadequate - a single KY-8 secure
voice UHF link that could not handle the information
flow. That being the case, Combat Apple
communicated its SIGINT take directly to Disco
while the Teaball center was left out OflOOp.133
(Sl/SI) Teaball finally worked its first
Linebacker mission on 15 August, but the results
were termed "marginal" since the offensive portion
of it did not operate. Two days later, MiGs
were scrambled from Phuc Yen and Gia Lam, but
their pilots broke off an attack as the F-4 MiGCAP
was vectored at them. Contrary to some claims,
the North Vietnamese did not order a standdown
of all air operations after the first Teaball
involvement in a Linebacker mission.P" They
continued to fly intercept missions.
(S//SI) The communications problems, both
technical and procedural, still vexed the workings
of Teaball with the rest of the air battle control
system. On 22 August, 7th Air Force issued new
rules of control designed to clear up the confu­
SIOn:
Seventh Air Force first made Disco responsible
for controlling the three :YliGCAP missions ­
ingress MiGCAP, mission MiGCAP, and egress
MiGCAP - when there were no MiGs airborne,
but when MiGs were airborne, Teaball took
over, controlling the MiGCAP with Disco as a
backup. (Disco and Red Crown were designated
as back up control centers when Teaball
communications failed.) Red Crown controlled
all the strike, chaff, and escort forces, and
Teaball could warn these forces on Guard [frequencies]
if they were being attacked. Red
CrO\\11 could also give warnings to the MiGCAP
(who were not on their radio frequency) on
Guard if they were being attacked.
While Teaball controlled the MiGCAP. Disco
could, with a consistent QRC-248 IFF radar
contact on a MiG, take over control if Teaball
chose to pass it. Additionally, if Teaball went
dO\~11, Disco took over; if both were down, then
Red CrO\\1l would take over. 135
(S/SI) These new rules did nothing to fix the
problem. Graphically, the entire Linebacker
warning and control communications system
resembled a multiheaded thing. The number of
controllers and the problem of communications
efficiency often left the Air Force crews confused
over who was in charge. When part of the system
failed, as it often did, the gap between the loss of
one controller, Teaball, and the appearance of the
backup could leave pilots without any support
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