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spartans_in_darkness

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TOfl SEeREffle6MINTHX1<br />

(U) The MiG-17was a slow, poorly<br />

armed aircraft, especially when<br />

compared to its American counterparts.<br />

It lacked an ability to carry airto-air<br />

missiles and relied solely on its<br />

cannon. This meant that it had to<br />

close <strong>in</strong> on its targets to be effective.<br />

I<br />

Its one advantage, an ability to turn<br />

<strong>in</strong>side the less maneuverable U.S. aircraft<br />

was often frittered away due a<br />

lack of aggressiveness by the<br />

Vietnamese pilots. The MiG-17 was<br />

generally <strong>in</strong>effective <strong>in</strong> general air<br />

combat and was used mostly for lowlevel<br />

po<strong>in</strong>t defense and <strong>in</strong>tercept.<br />

III<br />

It~<br />

-I d:<br />

(U) On the other hand, the Sovietdesigned<br />

MiG-2I, even its strippeddown<br />

export version, was comparable<br />

to the American front-l<strong>in</strong>e fighters of the time, the<br />

F-4 and the navy's F-8 (Crusader). It was superior<br />

<strong>in</strong> maneuverability and acceleration, especially<br />

at high altitudes, to American jets. Flown by an<br />

experienced pilot, the Fishbed could hold its own,<br />

Armed with both guns and <strong>in</strong>frared air-to-air<br />

missiles, the MiG-2I proved a difficult and dangerous<br />

adversary.<br />

(V) MiG-21 (Flshbed)<br />

(U) Hanoi's ma<strong>in</strong> organizational advantage<br />

was that its air defense system was <strong>in</strong>tegrated,<br />

and that it could call on any comb<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />

resources to meet the threat, whether it be AM,<br />

SAMs, or fighters. Back<strong>in</strong>g up this was Hanoi's<br />

ma<strong>in</strong> operational advantage, its GCl system. With<br />

radar coverage extend<strong>in</strong>g to almost 100 miles<br />

outside its borders, North Vietnamese controllers<br />

had the ability to detect Air Force and Navy<br />

strikes early and could track and control their<br />

own MiGs. They could position their pilots <strong>in</strong>to<br />

tactical advantage, while warn<strong>in</strong>g them of<br />

approach<strong>in</strong>g American <strong>in</strong>terceptors.<br />

(U) This was someth<strong>in</strong>g the American pilots<br />

lacked. Land-based radar coverage <strong>in</strong>to North<br />

Vietnam was limited. Such systems could see only<br />

a short distance; similar efforts by the Navy with<br />

(V) North Vietnamese early warn<strong>in</strong>q radar coveraqe.<br />

The solid l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>dlcates the limit ofdetection fot'ln<br />

F-105-size '1itct'lft Ay<strong>in</strong>g 'It 15,000 feet. The broken<br />

l<strong>in</strong>e Indicates the limit ofdetection ofthe same type<br />

of'litct'lft'lt 5,000 feet.<br />

Page 248<br />

T6P SEeRETHeOMINff/)(l

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