spartans_in_darkness

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USMA.AG viewed the outcome of fight at Ap Bac.
Consider, as well, how the history of the early
cryptologic effort in Southeast Asia, In the
Shadow ofWar, written in 1969, treated the same
battle:
In January 1963, the ARVN used ARDF information
to mount an operation in Dinh Tuong
Province that resulted in a major ARVN-Viet
Cong clash with relatively heavy [my italics]
Viet Cong losses in comparison with ARVN
casualties. 6 7
(SHSI) Since the communist losses were
something in the range of about one-tenth of
Saigon's, exactly what an unfavorable ratio of
losses would be was not indicated!
(~//~I) Simply getting a handle on ARVN military
operations could be just as difficult. Earlier,
we saw how ARVN operations might not even
come off, while other D/F fixes of communist
transmitting sites and terminals might go
nowhere with ARVN planners. It was not until
after mid-1963 that any kind of tally of ARVN
military operations based on ARDF results was
known. For a twelve-month period beginning in
June 1963, at least fifteen tactical operations were
launched by Saigon's forces. The most effective
was in late July-early August 1963 in the An
Xuyen Province on the Cau Mau Peninsula.
There, the ARVN 21st Division launched an
attack which resulted in the capture of a communist
communications center and a homemade
arms factory. Over ninety communist personnel
were claimed to have been killed with the ARVN
suffering less than ten total casualties.P"
(U) Still, the performance by Saigon's forces,
even with the tactical advantages offered by SIG­
INT, continued to be mediocre at best. As 1963
ended, the political unrest generated by the overthrow
and murder of Diem would further dissipate
the military's energies as various generals
tied up numerous units in coups and the suppression
of dissident elements like the Buddhists. It
was not a prescription for victory.
(S//SI) The Marines, Air Force, and
NSA Establish Their Southeast Asian
Mainland Missions
(SHSI) Within a year of the ASAsetting up its
station at Tan Son Nhut, other elements of the
American cryptologic community started to
arrive on the scene. These newly arriving units
found themselves in much the same boat as ASA
had been in during its first days. They, too, needed
a lot of training on the communications environment;
plus, they had to develop an operational
and organizational niche, that is, they had to "fit
in" the growing cryptologic mission. The first to
arrive after the army were the U.S. Marine Corps
cryptologists.
(S//B!) The Marines Corps almost made it to
Southeast Asia during the Laotian crisis of late
1959. Initially, when the ASA command was
caught flat-footed by the demands of manning a
site in Thailand (as well as supporting the Laotian
crisis task force), the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) offered a team oftwenty marines from the
1st Composite Radio Company (COMRADCO),
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) stationed
at Kaneohe, Hawaii. The CNO felt that the
Marines could make an "interim contribution" to
the army's effort, and this could enhance the
COMRADCO's capability to direct support possible
operations by JTF-116 in Laos. 69 However,
about a week later, the offer became moot as
CINCPAC put JTF-116 on alert and assigned
operational control of the marines (designated
USN-414A) to the commander of the Marine
Expeditionary Force attached to the task force."
(TS//BI) In December 1961, the u.s. ambassador
to South Vietnam, Frederick Nolting,
approached Vietnamese president Diem with a
request to increase the cryptologic contingents in
South Vietnam. His immediate requirement was
for another 236 ASApersonnel and a marine unit
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