spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SEGRETHGOMnHH*4
what was going on in the Gulf of Tonkin. Instead,
the problem posed by the second Phu Bai report
was handled in a curious manner. Late on 4
August, Washington (050130Z August 1964),
NSA issued a Gulf of Tonkin situation report
which covered the events of 4 to 5 August. At the
end of the report, NSA added these interesting
sentences: "ALTHOUGH INITIAL MESSAGES
INDICATED THAT THE T142, T146, AND T333
WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ...
SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES [not further identified
in the report - a curious lapse by NSA which
we will address in detail later] SUGGEST THAT
NONE OF THESE [BOATS] WAS INVOLVED.
REPORTS FROM THE MADDOXTHAT IT WAS
IDJDER ATTACK SOME SEVEN1Y NAUTICAL
MILES NORTHEAST OF THE NAVAL BASEAT
QUANG KHE SUGGEST THAT NAVAL UNITS
SUBORDINATE TO THE SOUTHERN FLEET
COMMAND ... WERE INVOLVED...." 117
(TS//SI) However, the effort to find "culprits"
only compounded the errors: the only boats
known to be stationed permanently at Quang Khe
were Swatow-class patrol boats which did not
carry torpedoes.l'" All P-4 torpedo boats staged
from Port Wallut far northwest of the action.
Accusing the Swatow craft of participating in the
attack was no "solution"; in fact, it only added to
the confusion. In reality, though, this statement
by NSA was a vain attempt to cover the problem
of the contradictory report from Phu Bai. It was
nothing but speculation - ignorant speculation at
that. Furthermore, this summary report still did
not address the issue of the total lack of intercept
of any North Vietnamese attack command and
control communications.
(D) Fingering the Swatows as the culprits
only made the "attack" scenario more improbable
for another reason. The distance from Quang Khe
naval base 07"46'N, 106"29'£) to the reported
first radar plot by the Maddox, forty to forty-five
nautical miles northeast of its position, is about
120 nautical miles. However, this distance should
not be construed as a "straight line" dash from
Quang Khe. Because the DRVboats were "detected"
coming from the east, they would have had to
travel in a long arc northward and then southeast
around the American destroyers which were
speeding to the southeast. Also, remember that
the Maddox and Turner Joy did not "detect"
these boats until they approached from the east,
so the route to the north of the American destroyers
had to be at a distance sufficient to avoid discovery
by radar. This lengthens to a distance of
around 180 nautical miles. Since the "attack
order" was issued at 1115Z and the initial radar
plot was at 1336Z (and we are presuming that the
postulated boats left at the exact time of the first
intercept, or were soon under way at the time),
then the boats would have had to have been traveling
at a speed of nearly seventy miles per hour
(about 110 kph) to have been where the Maddox
first detected them - at a rate some 58 percent
higher than the Swatow's known top speed!
(U) The only other base from which the
"attack" could have been staged was Port Wallut,
which was the base for the P-4 Squadron 135.The
distance from Port Wallut (2t"13'N, 107"34'£) to
the initial point of detection by the Desoto radars
is about 140 nautical miles. However, the same
problem exists here as for Quang Khe, though not
quite as extreme, for the P-4s. The scenario presumes
that they would have been moving at a little
less than seventy miles per hour, or a good 40
percent higher than the boat's listed maximum
speed.
(£//£I) Another possibility to consider when
looking at the "attack message" is that there was
some other activity to which the "military operations"
(if that is the interpretation one could
have) might have referred. In fact, there was
something else going on that night of 4/5 August
which is seldom mentioned in the public record:
a maritime OPLAN-34A mission was, in fact,
moving northward along the DRV coastline at the
time when the American destroyers were shooting
away at those radar returns. The Marolda and
Fitzgerald history of the U.S. Navy in Vietnam
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