spartans_in_darkness

.4. (d)
equipment, and
techniques that
Saigon lacked.
effort. Without any real growth in organization,
skills, equipment, or even an understanding of
the SIGINT process, the Vietnamese were unprepared
for the explosive growth brought about by
Vietnamization. Yet, as has been noted,
Americans, both in Saigon and at Fort Meade,
seemed unconvinced that the Vietnamese could
develop a proficient program.
(8//81) The Vietnamese, as well, were .not
blameless; they were often unrealistic in what
they thought they could do.1 ~vas a
creature of Saigon politics who desIred to see the
SSTB grow rather than improve. Even up to the
final American withdrawal in 1973, he was developing
schemes to acquire more capabilities than
his personnel reasonably and effectively could
absorb. Possibly he was influenced by the benefits
of the VIMP. As the SSTB fell into aOPia
of equipment, money, and personnel • ay
have interpreted this new affluence ess.
However, like the Vietnamese military, which
under Vietnamization had grown enormously,
and still was critically dependent on U.S.
air power and logistics, the SSTB ultimately
relied on NSA and ASA to supply the advice,
(8//~I) It is
also possible that
the structure that
the Vietnamese
SIGINT took ­
an imitation
of the American
system - may
have been unsuitable
for them.
A system of large,
technically
sophisticated
field sites with
centrally managed
collection,
processing, and reporting, and connected with an
advanced, secure, and high-speed communications
network might have worked well with a
technically proficient and command-responsive
workforce. However, for the Vietnamese, as the
Danang Processing Center chronicle illustrated,
this system was, at best, difficult to implement
and equally hard to maintain. It may be that the
Vietnamese, because of their low level of technical
competence and a hierarchical social structure,
were unsuited to an American-style SIGINT
organization. What might have worked would
have been a system that emphasized mobility and
direct support and that made use of their organic
language skills.
(8//81) Whatever opportunities had existed,
they had been dissipated in the years before the
VIMP was implemented. What NSAhoped to create
through the VIMP was meant to fill in for the
loss of American cryptologic sources in South
Vietnam·1
I
Icalled only for a wideband
intercept mISSIOn for Saigon; otherwise, the
American presence would be exclusively advisory.
The plan called for the Vietnamese to collect
I
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EO 1.4. (c)