spartans_in_darkness

'FOP SE6RHh'60MltHi'l*1
When the fighting was finished, eight Americans
were dead and another 126 were wounded. Ten
U.S. aircraft were destroyed and fifteen were
damaged. Presidential national security advisor,
McGeorge Bundy, visiting Saigon on a fact-finding
tour, rushed north to survey the damage. On
the phone to Washington, he described the scene
of destruction and urged President Johnson to
strike back.
CU) The retaliation came on 8 February when
almost fifty U.S. navy aircraft from the carriers
Coral Sea and Hancock dropped bombs and
rockets on the PAVN barracks at Dong Hoi, a Ho
Chi Minh Trail staging area forty miles north of
the DMZ. The raids were the start of Operation
Flaming Dart 1. The next day, the USAF and
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) launched a raid on
the transport and communications center at Vinh
Linh. On 11 February, the USAF, USN, and VNAF
massed over 160 aircraft to raid the staging points
and barracks at Chan Hoa and Chap Le, 150 and
40 miles, respectively, north of the DMZ.
CU) For the next two-and-a-half weeks the
bombing was halted while the Johnson administration
considered its next move. On 24 February
President Johnson finally approved a sustained
air campaign against North Vietnam. No longer
would air strikes be predicated on any retaliatory
policy; it was a full campaign to damage Hanoi's
ability to support the southern communist movement.
The air assault was called Rolling Thunder,
and on 2 March 1965 it began (after a postponement
on 26 February due to poor weather) when
forty-five USAF F-105s and B-57s hit ammunition
dumps at Xom Bong. Meanwhile, sixty-five
VNAFaircraft bombed the Quang Khe naval base.
The air war in Indochina was now on in earnest.
(s//sn As for SIGINT, its role in the air was
limited to enhancing the defensive posture of U.S.
air strikes. That is, by monitoring the DRV air
defense network, it could provide tip-offs to U.S.
aircraft of tracking by Hanoi's nationwide system
of radars and visual observation sites. SIGI1'.l
also could detect the activation of defense systems,
such as surface-to-air missiles, AAA, and
fighter reactions. Finally, it could warn individual
flights of immediate threats from the North
Vietnamese. In doing this, the U.S. SIGINT system
faced a formidable task that would last for
years. It would be a struggle that would see periods
of success highlighted by notable victories. At
the same time, though,
the North Vietnamese
proved adept at modifying
their tactics and procedures.
This flexibility
would challenge U.S.
SIGINT constantly to
improve its methods and
systems in order to keep
up with Hanoi's reactions.
(D) North
Vietnam's Air
Defense System
(V) Results of early Rolling Thunder strike 'It Linh Dong supply depot
(U) In attacking the
DRVin 1965, the airforce,
marine, and naval air
arms of the United States
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