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ability to pin point their locations, a 33rd
Regiment staff conference held after the battle
concluded that they had spies in their midst."
('TS//S:t) Of course, it had not been spies
which had given away their positions; rather, it
was airborne direction finding that had flagged
the NVA units for the air strikes. But it was an
ARDF capability with a difference: no longer were
the results held up until the aircraft landed.
Instead, the aircraft passed their results directly
to the ASA unit in support of the tactical commander.
Secure air-to-ground communications
were achieved 'with the use of a one-time pad for
passing the D/F results. The DSU, in this case the
371st RRC, had modified an intercept position
into a controller for the ARDF mission aircraft.
For Ia Drang, five mission aircraft were allocated.
Fixes could be passed from a plane to the commander
in under thirty minutes;"
(T8//81) Ia Drang had been the first significant
test for tactical SIGINT in an ongoing operation.
Initially, it had demonstrated its value by
alerting MACV to the moves of the PAVN regiments
around Plei Me. The D/F proved to be useful
as a targeting tool for tactical air strikes, allowing
for B-52s, in particular, to be utilized. Still, Ia
Drang was not a totally unmitigated success for
SIGINT. At least four times during the struggle,
ARVN and American units had been ambushed
by large communist units - twice during helicopter
landings - and SIGINT had been unable to
detect the traps. In all cases, firepower, in the
form of air strikes and artillery support, had been
essential in retrieving dangerous tactical situations
for the Americans. The Air Force had to
mount almost five times the number of air sorties
than it had originally planned in order to support
the Ist Air Cavalry.2:3
(8//81) This trend of beating the communist
forces to the draw continued into early and mid­
1966. For example, during March in the western
Central Highlands, SIGINT had picked up the
movement of PAVN command and intelligence
units eastward towards Pleiku and Kontum. A
tactical command element was isolated which
appeared to have assumed control of operations.i"
Before the movements could be consolidated,
General Westmoreland dispatched troops
from the C.S. 25th Infantry Division. For the next
two months, the division's units maneuvered
across the region forcing the communist troops to
fight or withdraw, They also cleared the major
north-south road, Route 14, connecting the
provincial capitals. In June, the 101st Airborne
Division launched Operation Hawthorne to clear
the area near Dak To. By the end of July 1966, the
communist command and intelligence elements
had withdrawn, their plans apparently frustrated.
CU) For all of the head-on fighting with the
Americans, Hanoi's troops had little positive to
show for the heavy casualties it had sustained.
Westmoreland's forces had broken up every
major communist military initiative before they
could be effective. In the summer of 1966,
Westmoreland had completed the buildup of U.S.
forces to the point he now felt he could conduct
large-scale operations which he termed "search
and destroy." This approach, while not always
bagging the PAVN and PLAF units, had the
important by-product of denying the communist
planners the element they needed the most ­
time. Time always was the necessary ingredient
for the planning and preparations of communist
military operations. Unlike the Americans, who
extended their lines of supply and communications
to facilitate offensives, the communist
approach required the preparation of a battlefield
before an assault. This meant the prepositioning
of supplies and the rehearsal of unit roles. The
sweeps by the big U.S. units compelled the communist
troops to abandon the supply stockpiles
and prepared positions. The communists no
longer had the luxury of an uninterrupted period
leading up to an attack."
CU) General Thanh came under political
attack in Hanoi for his bloody strategy. The main
critique was his emphasis of main force opera-
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