spartans_in_darkness

EO 1.4. (c)
al effects, such as pictures and letters. Not that
this always worked. Many times, the local Viet
Cong committees had to remind their subordinate
elements to remove all such incriminating
material from their people.I
and possibly intelligence operatives along the
coast.
(TS//SI) The infiltration of men and supplies
by sea required the buildup from scratch of an
organization, a logistics and maintenance base,
workable and secure procedures, and therecruit~
ment of ersonnel to/run it
(U) Group 759 and Maritime
Infiltration, 1959-1963
CD) The second leg of the infiltration system
set up by Hanoi was the maritime infiltration
program. The combined North and South
Vietnamese coastline is more than 3,000 kilometers,
while the South's alone is almost 2,000.
The coastline itself varies greatly, with
stretches of sandy beachline interrupted by a !
number of stream mouths and bays, the
largest concentration being the maze on the
seaward edge of the Mekong Delta. All of
this difficult geography had the makings of
an intractable problem for Saigon to solve.
An added difficulty was the large private
fleet of fishing boats which worked the
coastline along the South China Sea. The
hundreds of boats and junks operated with
little control and were almost impossible to
track.
L...- -_--------JAlso, an organization
in the south had to be recruited and
trained in handling the boats, providing cover,
Iand storinpofsmuggled materialJ I
.s.. .;.
L...-_----I In July 1959, the Group 759 had
been organized under the command of Rear
Admiral Tran Van Giang. 58 At first, actual
operations was assigned to the 603rd
Special Battalion located at Haiphong,
which moved military personnel and supplies
down the southern coastline. A second
organization, the Communications Section
of the Lao Dong Party's Research Office,was
concerned with the transport of party agents
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(TS//SI) M