spartans_in_darkness

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order to execute the retaliatory raid, codenamed
Pierce Arrow. At 1030G (0330Z), naval strike aircraft
from Ticonderoga were launched. By early
afternoon they hit several targets in the DRV,
including almost all of its naval installations.
(U) The Silent Dogs: What the
SIGINT Really Did (and Did Not)
Report
(8//SI) Events surrounding the apparent second
attack had been driven almost exclusively by
SIGINT. Herrick's personal doubts, the false
sonar readings, the confused radar returns, and
the pilots' reports, all subverted the validity of the
attack reports. But not the SIGINT. For the
Johnson administration, both reports - the initial
Critic reporting the North Vietnamese preparations
for operations, and the after-action report ­
acted as factual bookends, propping up the other
pieces of contentious evidence. The details of the
attack, as contradictory as they were, could be
massaged or explained to fit the scenario set by
the SIGINT. For example, since there were no
reported shootdowns of American aircraft that
night, then the North Vietnamese report of
downed u.s. planes must have resulted when
they had confused illuminating flares for falling
aircraft. 107
(S//SI) However, there were many problems
specific to the SIGINT information which
emerged almost as soon as it was being reported.
In this section we will reconsider what happened
that night using all of the relevant SIGINT. We
will begin with the initial order to the Vietnamese
boats ordering them to make ready for military
operations.
fS//BI) Exhibit A: The FirstAttack Message
(8//81) The first product, the "attack" message,
issued at 1115Z (1815G), reported only the
fact that there was a possible DRV naval operation
planned against the Desoto patrol. At 1140Z
(1840G), this was followed up by a second report
from Phu Bai which contained a number of
details, such as that T-146 and T-333 were to
carry out military operations with T-142. Unlike
the messages of 2 August, there was no reference
to an "enemy," no tracking to equate to the
Desoto patrol, or any indication of the nature of
the operations to be carried out by the boats. In
fact, the original intercepted message was only
the first part of a larger message, the rest of which
was not intercepted. So, what might have been in
the latter part is unknown, except that it might
have amplified the meaning of the type of operation
the boats were involved in.
(8//81) What made this intercept a Critic was
the interpretation of the expression "military
operation" put to it by the Marine SIGINT site at
Phu Bai, which stated that this was an "OPERA­
TION PLANNED AGAINST THE DESOTO
PATROL." 108 The follow-up report from Phu Bai
amplified the original Critic and maintained, as
well, that the attack was against the Desoto mission.I''"
When one considers the events of
2 August, this interpretation was not totally
unfounded; one could see a reference to a military
operation as an attack being directed against the
American warships. However, the text of the
intercept never mentioned a target or any objective
of the military operation, or even the nature
of the operation. As we shall see soon, not everyone
who saw this intercept jumped to the same
conclusion that an attack against the American
ships was being planned.
(8/;'81) Another problem is that the decrypted
Vietnamese phrase for military operations, hanh
quan, has an alternate meaning of "forced or long
march or movement," which, in a nautical context,
could refer to a voyage by both T-146 and T­
333. As it turns out, this is the activity that the
intercept was actually alluding to.
(8//80 For at 1440Z, almost at the precise
moment that Herrick ordered his two destroyers
to open fire on the approaching radar returns, the
Phu Bai intercept site issued a spot report which
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