spartans_in_darkness

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TSP SESRETNSSMltHHX1
(remember, this is a manual system with three
charts), then the actual time of the composition of
the message must be pushed back closer to the
beginning of the so-called engagement. Even if
we are generous with our appreciation of the skill
of the Vietnamese communications personnel in
encrypting the message, we still have to concede
some time to get the message from composition
to transmission. The more time we allow for this
process, then the closer its origin comes up to the
time that the destroyers first opened fire. In that
case, then, the intercept cannot be considered an
after-action report of the events currently occurring
at sea in the Gulf of Tonkin.
(8//80 The question of the time of origin for
the information in the Vietnamese message gets
even more suspect when we consider the identities
of the Vietnamese who may have sent and
received it. The NSA translation carries the two
callwords "TRA" and "LAP" as unidentified.
Actually, this is not true. San Miguel, in its
reports, identified the transmitting station,
known by the covername "TRA," as the T-142
patrol boat. The receiving station, "LAP," was
identified as a shore station at My Due, possibly
the coastal observation post which earlier had
tracked the American ships.v'"
cg//gI) In reality, these equations probably
were incorrect. The probable identities for the
covernames had been known for some time; it is
just that San Miguel confused them. "TRA" had
been associated with a DRV naval HQs in
Haiphong as recently as 2 August. "LAP" had
been identified with T-142 on 30 July.l4l
However, the exact identities are not important.
What is critical is that Haiphong could not have
originated the information in the intercept; it had
to come from some other source. Another station
had to compose a report, encrypt, and transmit
the information to Haiphong before it could, in
turn, send its message. This means that the very
first version of this "after-action" report probably
was composed at or before the time the two
destroyers opened fire!
(8//8I) NSA should have highlighted the
message file time, 2242G (l542Z) and the intercept
time, 1550Z (2250G), in the translation.
These times would have indicated that the intercept
could not have been construed as an afteraction
report. The critical aspect of the time elements
was not noted in the translation. Instead, it
seems that the time NSA released the translation,
1933Z (or 1955Z if it had been relayed), was the
critical element. That the translation was issued
some two and one-half hours after the incident
was over probably was the reason it was interpreted
by its Washington recipients as a North
Vietnamese after-action report.
cg//gI) The translation as issued is hardly
helpful in providing a useful background to
explain its significance. The title, "DRV NAVAL
ENTIlY REPORTS LOSSES AND CLAIMS TWO
ENEMY AIRCRAFf SHOT DOWN," does not
indicate any context for the translation. That
being so, it would not be difficult to infer that the
translation referred to the recently ended combat
action. So, it just hung there waiting for someone
to claim it, and the Johnson administration
jumped on it. Remember, this translation arrived
in Washington midway in the afternoon of 4
August just at the time that the administration
was trying to resolve the doubts about the attack
that Captain Herrick had reported. And, as we
have seen, it was to be the answer to all of the lingering
doubts as to the validity of the attack. NSA
itself would use the translation to support the
contention that there had been a second attack as
well, quoting excerpts from it in several Gulf of
Tonkin Summary reports issued from 4 to 6
August. The problem with the file and intercept
times is a critical one. The failure by the analysts
who issued the translation to draw attention to
the importance of the two times allowed the
administration to interpret the translation as a
Vietnamese after-action report.
cg//gn Yet, it is the fourth problem with the
translation which is the most troublesome: that
is, specifically, how it was put together. It was
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